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BALANCING LEGAL PROCESS WITH 
SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE: EXPERT 
WITNESS METHODOLOGY IN FIVE 
NATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
REFORM OF POST-DAUBERT U.S. 
RELIABILITY DETERMINATIONS 
 
ANDREW W. JURS* 
In a recent article on science and the law, Susan Haack suggested that 
“we could learn something from the experiences of other nations that are 
equally technologically advanced, but have different . . . legal 
arrangements.”  Her suggestion is both appropriate and timely, as the 
evidence mounts on the problems with the current judicial management of 
complex science. 
This Article starts with a simple, related premise, that the proper 
balance of legal process and scientific expertise is not a uniquely 
American problem.  If this is true, then we should, as Haack suggests, 
seek inspiration for reform in the varying methodologies of other nations.  
After beginning with a critical examination of the U.S. expert witness 
system, this Article discusses the handling of expert witnesses in multiple 
common law nations (Canada and the United Kingdom) and in multiple 
civil law nations (Germany and Japan).  After examining those systems, 
this Article makes recommendations as to which methodologies, currently 
in use and tested in those nations, offer the most promise in fixing the 
weaknesses exposed in our system. 
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By reviewing the weaknesses in Daubert assessment of complex 
expert testimony, how other nations handle similar evidence, and how 
certain discrete areas of foreign law could address the weaknesses 
identified in the U.S. approach, this Article offers reform alternatives to 
assist judges in balancing the need for accuracy and reliability of the 
science presented in court with the need to maintain our traditions of legal 
process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of 
nationality, but of usefulness and need.  No one bothers to fetch a 
thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, but 
only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow in his 
back garden. 
Rudolph von Jhering1 
 
As a necessity of modern tort litigation, expert witnesses commonly 
present complex evidence for parties in litigation.2  Before the 
presentation of expert testimony at trial in a U.S. federal court, the 
expert has already maneuvered through the essential preliminary steps: 
the expert has been selected and retained by the party; assessed the 
primary materials; issued a report; given deposition testimony; and may 
have been evaluated for admissibility by the trial judge under the 
Daubert standard.3  Many of these steps are intended to ensure the 
reliability of the expert’s opinion. 
However, in the most complex and detailed tort cases, researchers 
and commentators have demonstrated significant problems and 
weaknesses in the appraisal of scientific testimony under Daubert.4  
Even before the judge in a particular case addresses contested expert 
issues, systematic concerns may threaten the truth-seeking function of 
the proceeding.5  At the Daubert gatekeeping stage, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence require judges to screen experts for reliability, yet research 
suggests that judges often lack the skills to adequately assess the quality 
of science presented in court.6  Even with this concern, tools intended to 
 
1. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 17 
(Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW] 
(quoting Rudolph von Jhering). 
2. As a class of cases, toxic torts demonstrate high reliance for, and necessity of, expert 
witnesses.  M. Neil Browne, Terri J. Keeley & Wesley J. Hiers, The Epistemological Role of 
Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1, 3 (1998). 
3. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
4. See infra Parts II.B–.E. 
5. See infra Parts II.B–.E. 
6. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL 
ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 72 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989); Sophia I. 
Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert 
Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442 (2001) (demonstrating 
that judges were split on whether they had the necessary background to handle scientific 
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provide judges with help in their gatekeeping functions are rarely used.7  
In this environment, reform of the expert witness system is often 
suggested but rarely implemented, while the judicial system maintains a 
tolerance for the potential for inaccurate results.8  We can do better. 
Striking the proper balance of scientific expertise and legal process is 
not a uniquely American problem, and legal systems of other major 
industrialized nations necessarily address the same issue.  Even if legal 
commentary may confine scholars within the intricacies of their own 
legal system, legal reform efforts should—and often appropriately do—
consider alternative methods used by various legal systems.9  Combining 
the understanding that expert witness issues are not uniquely American 
with the idea that other nations offer alternatives, we can conclude that 
other major nations of the world may be able to supply methods to 
correct the problems of the American expert witness system.10 
This Article will assess various approaches to balancing legal due 
process with the necessity of scientific expertise in modern tort 
litigation.  In doing so, the role of expert witnesses within two nations of 
 
evidence in their courtroom); Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. 
& POL’Y 19, 19–20 (2007); Richard Lempert, Befuddled Judges: Statistical Evidence in Title 
VII Cases, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT app. 2, at 263, 278 (Bernard 
Grofman ed., 2000); see also infra Part II.D.1. 
7. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas S. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role 
for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004–05 & 
tbl.1 (1994); Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns 
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 326 
tbl.5 (2002); see also discussion infra Part II.E. 
8. On the issue of the cyclical nature of reform efforts, see Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, 
Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1392–1400 (2005) 
(reviewing TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF 
SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (2004)) (chronicling several 
recurring reform suggestions, from 1860 to the present era).  Regarding the system’s “extreme 
tolerance for low-accuracy results” when dealing with science, see Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, 
and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1115 (1966). 
9. On comparative law as a fertile area for reform, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 9, 17 (2d ed. 1993); Bradley Bryan, 
Justice and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein’s Conception of Comparative Law and 
Procedural Justice in Question, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 521, 537–39 (2004); Basil 
Markesinis, Comparative Law—A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53 MOD. L. REV. 1, 21 
(1990). 
10. See generally David Kinley & Alan Rose, The Quest for the Truth: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Role of Experts in Litigation, 31 AUS. J. FORENSIC SCI. 5, 16 (1999); John H. 
Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 
545, 552 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure]. 
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the common law family—Canada11 and the United Kingdom12—will be 
reviewed, followed by an assessment of the civil law tradition in 
Germany13 and Japan.14  This Article will identify those methodologies 
currently in use within other legal systems15 that offer the most promise 
for solving problems identified within our own system.16  Borrowing 
from other national systems addressing similar concerns, this Article 
proposes significant changes to the Daubert regime in order to promote 
reliability and preserve legal process. 
To achieve these aims, this Article begins by examining the 
problems faced by judges in the United States when applying the 
Daubert test for scientific admissibility, focusing, in Part II, on empirical 
assessments of judicial perception of that system and its weaknesses.  
Then, in Part III, it will shift from the issues posed by expert witnesses in 
the United States to a discussion of comparative methodology in 
general, involving the theory behind comparison of different nations’ 
systems.  Next, Part IV will describe the rules, methods, and limits of 
expertise in legal systems of other major industrialized nations, both in 
common law and in civil law traditions.  Finally, in Part V, this Article 
will assess specific areas of expert witness law from other nations that 
could address the weaknesses of the Daubert regime identified in Part 
II. 
By reviewing the perceived weaknesses in the assessment of expert 
testimony in complex tort cases under Daubert, and examining how 
certain aspects of foreign law could address the weaknesses identified in 
the U.S. approach, this Article will offer suggestions for legal reform to 
assist judges in balancing the need for reliability of the science presented 
in court, with the need to maintain our key traditions of legal process. 
II.  EXPERT WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
In her recent article Irreconcilable Differences?  The Troubled 
Marriage of Science and Law, Susan Haack assessed the current state of 
 
11. See infra Part IV.A. 
12. See infra Part IV.B. 
13. See infra Part IV.D. 
14. See infra Part IV.E. 
15. See infra Part V.B. 
16. As one commentator notes, “[i]f law is a means to an end, then it is something we 
can alter to fit our needs.”  Bryan, supra note 9, at 554.  As such, we can consider those 
institutions which accomplish things in various polities as rich “techniques for . . . 
understand[ing] differing ways to approach problems.”  Id. at 538. 
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complex science in the legal system, and concluded: “Maybe we could 
learn something from the experiences of other countries that are equally 
technologically advanced, but have different regulatory and legal 
arrangements; certainly, we would do well to approach these problems 
in a more empirical, experimental—a more scientific—spirit.”17  A 
detailed review of other nations’ approaches to the issue of complex 
science, responding in part to Haack’s suggestion, forms much of the 
latter half of this Article.18  However, it is appropriate to first consider 
systematic constraints that create an environment where the validity and 
reliability of science presented in complex litigation may be in question. 
A.  The Background and Basics of Daubert 
Since the 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
federal judges screen contested expert evidence for admissibility under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, by assessing both its relevance to the case 
and the reliability of the scientific methodology.19  In the Daubert 
decision itself, the Justices were not entirely in agreement on the ability 
of federal judges to assess the reliability of expert methodologies.  
Writing for the seven-vote majority, Justice Blackmun expressed 
confidence in the federal judiciary’s ability to weigh competing 
methodologies of science, pronouncing that “[w]e are confident that 
federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.”20  In 
dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, while affirming his confidence in 
federal judges, questioned whether they would be able to apply the 
majority’s unclear standard, and deplored their being asked “to become 
amateur scientists.”21  Almost immediately after the Daubert decision, 
there was debate regarding both the merits of judicial screening for 
scientific reliability and about the feasibility of judicial assessment of 
scientific merit.22 
 
17. Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences?  The Troubled Marriage of Science and 
Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009, at 1, 23. 
18. See infra Part IV. 
19. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).  After the 2000 
amendments, Rule 702 requires reliability screening.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
21. Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
22. Shortly after Daubert was issued in June 1993, articles assessed the impact of the 
decision on admissibility, debating the merits of the post-Frye evidentiary standard.  See, e.g., 
Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the Wake of 
Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 745–50, 786–800 
(1994); Susan R. Poulter, Daubert and Scientific Evidence: Assessing Evidentiary Reliability in 
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Before offering details of that debate, let me provide a brief 
overview of the screening process required by Daubert.  The first 
requirement for any proposed expert evidence is that it be relevant to a 
contested issue in the case.23  Relevance required no other definition, 
according to the Court’s opinion in Daubert, than the “fit” of the 
expertise to the case.24  On the issue of reliability, however, the Court 
provided guidelines to help courts assess the methodological soundness 
of the proposed expert testimony.25  Justice Blackmun gave a non-
exhaustive list of several factors that courts might consider in ensuring 
the reliability of scientific methodologies, including: “whether [the 
method] can be (and has been) tested,” peer review, “known or 
potential rate of error,” and general acceptance within the scientific 
community.26  As the Supreme Court later observed, federal judges can 
thereby ensure that the expert “employs in the courtroom the same 
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in 
the relevant field.”27 
With these guidelines after Daubert, federal judges must assess the 
methodological soundness of proposed expert testimony before deciding 
whether to admit it.  From the beginning, on the remand in Daubert 
itself, Judge Kozinski characterized the reliability assessment as 
“daunting.”28  The quality of judicial screening of complex science—and 
of the scientific evidence in general—presented in federal courtrooms 
remains controversial.29 
To assess the Daubert framework, and to evaluate its weakness, this 
Article will focus on a particular type of complex case—namely, the 
large civil damages case in federal court dependent on scientific 
 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1307, 1320–35 (evaluating the impacts, meanings, 
and uncertainties of the Daubert decision); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The 
Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 64–68 (1993); 
Symposium, The Impact of Science and Technology on the Courts, 43 EMORY L.J. 853 (1994) 
(symposium dedicated to science and technology, with a focus on Daubert). 
23. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 591. 
24. Id. at 591. 
25. Id. at 593–94. 
26. Id. 
27. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
28. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
29. For example, commentary regarding varying specialties, including high tech/IP law, 
environmental disputes, forensic science, and epidemiology, is discussed in Andrew W. Jurs, 
Science Court: Past Proposals, Current Considerations, and a Suggested Structure, 15 VA. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 23–24 (2010); see also infra Part II.D.2. 
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evidence for proof of the claims or defenses.30  While necessarily 
excluding some facets of the Daubert system,31 this focus will permit 
assessment of several important criticisms of the current system. 
If we want the judicial system to yield accurate results, there are 
several concerns about the current structure of expert selection and 
review that merit attention.  One concern is selection bias—namely, the 
selection of partisan or outlying experts by litigators to support a pre-
conceived position on the science.32  A second concern is the effect of 
legal methodology—the due process adversarial model—on the 
presentation of scientific materials in court.33  A third concern is the 
issue raised in Daubert by the disagreement between Justice Blackmun 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist: the ability of lay judges to handle 
assessment of scientific methodologies.34  Finally, current procedures to 
help judges in their Daubert review, as a check on the difficulties 
resulting from selection and adversarial biases, remain largely unused.35 
B.  Selection Bias 
Problems with the current adversarial model in complex litigation 
begin at the earliest stages of the expert involvement, from the bias 
inherent in partisan selection of experts.  Partisan selection bias is not a 
problem created by Daubert; it existed well before the turn of the last 
 
30. This subset is likely to have scientific issues that are fully litigated, contested, and 
case dispositive.  Therefore, they provide detailed judicial assessment of complex science, 
allowing for detailed review of judicial management of those scientific issues.  See supra note 
2 and accompanying text.  Regarding factors that could result in science being the dispositive 
issue in a case, see Jurs, supra note 29, at 30–31 (listing factors to consider for jurisdictional 
grant to one central “science court”). 
31. Of course, many important cases assessing complex science under a Rule 702 
reliability standard occur in state courts.  See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Havner, 953 
S.W.2d 706, 711, 714 (Tex. 1997) (noting that it was not the first court to address these issues 
and providing the factors for evaluating expert opinion evidence); In re Lockheed Litig. 
Cases, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 774–78 (Ct. App. 2005).  In addition, the issue of applying the 
Daubert standard in criminal prosecutions has gained attention following a recent report on 
forensics by the National Academy of Sciences.  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., COMM. ON 
IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 95–110 (2009) (“The present situation, 
however, is seriously wanting, both because of the limitations of the judicial system and 
because of the many problems faced by the forensic science community.”). 
32. See infra Part II.B. 
33. See infra Part II.C. 
34. See infra Part II.D. 
35. See infra Part II.E. 
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century.36  However, under Daubert, the problem gained additional 
attention, as the standard for admission changed from “general 
acceptance” under Frye—necessitating a review of the expert’s opinion 
as compared to the consensus of the overall field37—to the gatekeeping 
relevance and reliability standard of Rule 702.38  In this analysis, 
selection bias will be characterized in terms of two related but distinct 
problems: the problem of outlier enhancement and the problem of the 
professional witness in the marketplace of persuasion.  If reliability or 
validity of scientific testimony are desired ends, then each type of 
selection bias causes distinct difficulties with the expert witness role 
under the present rules.39 
Outlier enhancement occurs when a litigant selects an expert witness 
outside the mainstream of the discipline.  The reason why an expert is 
categorized as “outside the mainstream” varies.  Some experts remain 
outliers because they use non-standard methodology inconsistent with 
the mainstream of the field.40  Other experts may use traditional and 
accepted methodologies, but the conclusions they draw are outside 
mainstream thinking in the field.41  Haack notes that parties have an 
incentive to pick an expert “ready to accept an answer to some scientific 
question as warranted when others in the field still remain agnostic,” 
and that once an expert has testified repeatedly, a hesitant or nuanced 
 
36. Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias 
and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 65–70 (1998) (reviewing nineteenth century expert witness 
issues). 
37. The Frye analysis required federal judges to review the expert’s opinion as compared 
to the consensus of the overall field.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
(articulating “general acceptance” standard). 
38. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (describing the 
Frye general acceptance test: “That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials”). 
39. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 182 (2010) 
(accuracy of outcomes intrinsically and instrumentally beneficial). 
40. The unusual methodology may result from an ideological commitment to alternative 
methods.  See Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1133 (2001).  Or it could form from a subjective judgment leaning 
toward one side or the other.  See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and 
the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 456–57 (2008). 
41. See generally Haack, supra note 17, at 16–18.  These experts are often selected 
exactly due to their willingness to “incline” toward one or the other position.  See Bernstein, 
supra note 40, at 456 (explaining that “experts are selected ‘according as their opinion is 
known to incline’” (quoting Abinger v. Ashton, [1873] 17 L.R.Eq. 358, 374 (U.K.))); Joseph 
Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1577 (2007) [hereinafter Sanders, 
Expert Witness Ethics]. 
17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:13 PM 
2012] BALANCING LEGAL PROCESS 1339 
opinion can harden from “initially more cautious attitudes into 
unwarranted certainty.”42  Sanders describes this phenomenon in his 
assessment of the decades-long Bendectin litigation, where expert 
opinion simplified over time to reduce uncertainty.43  Outlying experts 
may offer sincere but idiosyncratic positions. 
The genuine experts outside the mainstream serve as one type of 
outlier enhancement, which is in contrast to those experts with 
“conscious bias”44 or who have succeeded in the professional-witness 
marketplace solely as a result of their persuasive force and ability to 
convey certainty.45  Conscious bias may result from loyalty to a client 
that retains the expert,46 or result from the expert’s metamorphosis over 
time to fit the needs of the professional witness market.47  In her work 
on expert problems, Jennifer Mnookin identifies one source of 
professional witness bias in the competition for expert witness services 
to meet the needs of the partisan client.48  As a result of competition 
within that market, the experts most likely to be repeatedly retained 
“will often not be those with the most knowledge or actual expertise in a 
particular area, but rather those whom parties believe will succeed in 
persuading the factfinder.”49  As a result, these experts become 
marketable by “being a ‘team player,’ and telling potential employers 
(that is, parties) what they want to hear.”50  Independent of the expert 
witness marketplace, the mere fact of payment alone could also result in 
expert bias.51 
Outlier enhancement, by itself, may not be a concern—who can 
blame partisans for partisanship?—until its effects on the adjudication 
of disputes are measured.  Under the current Federal Rules, the outlier 
enhancement problem has enormous potential to affect litigation 
 
42. Haack, supra note 17, at 17; see also Robertson, supra note 39, at 186–87. 
43. Sanders, supra note 22, at 37. 
44. Bernstein, supra note 40, at 454–55. 
45. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1011–12 (2008). 
46. Bernstein, supra note 40, at 454–55; Mnookin, supra note 45, at 1010–11; Robertson, 
supra note 39, at 185; Sanders, supra note 22, at 37; Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 40, at 
1133. 
47. See generally Mnookin, supra note 45, at 1011–12 (explaining the phenomenon of 
“professional” expert witnesses). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1011. 
50. Id. at 1012. 
51. Robertson, supra note 39, at 188 (discussing the bias effect of compensation). 
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outcomes.  Experts become necessary when there are factual issues that 
the factfinder is unable to decide without the assistance of specialized 
knowledge.52  A judge or jury hearing the testimony of the outlying 
expert is therefore peculiarly unable to assess its meaning in context.53  
As a result, testimony by outlying experts puts the reliability of results at 
risk.54 
While outlier enhancement is a serious concern, particularly with 
complex expert evidence beyond the ability of a layperson to weigh, it is 
only one of several serious shortcomings of the current system under 
Daubert.  Indeed, if the selection bias issue could be remedied by the 
parties, through the adversarial process or by the court, it would be 
easily cured and not affect outcome reliability.  As discussed infra, 
however, neither of these two potential remedies succeeds. 
C.  Adversarial Methodology Bias 
Selection bias would not threaten the reliability of outcomes if the 
adversarial process effectively screened away unreliable outliers—
professional witnesses, and other patently biased testimony—from 
reliable, appropriate testimony.  In the area of scientific or expert 
testimony, however, the adversarial method does not seem well-suited 
to achieve this end.55 
Joseph Sanders criticizes current adversarial methods by declaring 
that they “might as well have been designed to confuse, to leave the 
audience staring at an unresolved and apparently unresolvable 
 
52. See, e.g.,  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
53. Mnookin, supra note 45, at 1012; see also Deason, supra note 36, at 92–93; Sanders, 
supra note 22, at 38–39. 
54. See Bernstein, supra note 40, at 457 (noting that the “jury will receive a false sense 
that the issue is a very close one”); Haack, supra note 17, at 17 (stating that the adversarial 
process may create “artificial scientific doubt, or artificial scientific certainty” (footnote 
omitted)); Mnookin, supra note 45, at 1012 (stating that the “marketplace for experts cannot 
. . . be trusted to produce reliable information”); Robertson, supra note 39, at 181 (discussing 
the “truth-deficit in litigation”); Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, supra note 41, at 1578 (noting 
that “[f]ew deny the biasing effect of present arrangements”); Sanders, supra note 22, at 37 
(noting that “[p]ersuasiveness is not always a useful indicator of truth”); see also Vidmar & 
Diamond, supra note 40, at 1135–1167 (reviewing research into lay jurors and their 
understanding of complex expert testimony). 
55. The criticism of the adversarial method for scientific or expert witness disputes 
contrasts with the common assumption that “cross-examination” is the “‘greatest legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of truth.’”  Robertson, supra note 39, at 189 (quoting 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). 
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conflict.”56  John Langbein agrees, stating further that “[s]hort of 
forbidding the use of experts altogether, we probably could not have 
designed a procedure better suited to minimize the influence of 
expertise.”57  This is not a concern that arose from Daubert, since it 
existed before the turn of the last century.58  But it became particularly 
troubling when the admissibility standard changed from Frye to Rule 
702, resulting in a new era of judicial gatekeeping for reliability.59 
The potential for adversarial methods to affect reliability 
assessments has received much attention and study in recent years, 
particularly with analysis of the issue of cross-examination.  Research on 
the effect cross-examination “dirty tricks” have on reliability 
determinations serves as an example of the concern.  Kassin, Williams, 
and Saunders tested the effect of cross-examination questions 
containing a negative presumption on a mock jury’s perception of expert 
credibility.60  The test involved a rape trial, in which a cross-examining 
attorney asked a question that implied the expert’s research was poorly 
regarded by colleagues or had been sharply criticized.61  The question 
resulted in one of three responses: an admission, a denial, or an 
objection by opposing counsel and a withdrawal of the question.62  The 
researchers evaluated credibility scores for the expert given by the mock 
jurors, and the data indicated that, regardless of the response to the 
question and even in cases involving denial or withdrawal of the 
question, the negative implication of the presumptive question harmed 
expert credibility.63  This remained true even though the jurors also 
reported that they did not believe the negative fact contained within the 
presumptive question.64  As a result, the researchers note that 
presumptive questions are regularly employed, and that “this study 
 
56. Sanders, supra note 22, at 41 (quoting Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. 
L. REV. 1113, 1175. 
57. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823, 836 (1985) [hereinafter Langbein, The German Advantage]. 
58. Ryan M. Seidemann et al., Closing the Gate on Questionable Expert Witness 
Testimony: A Proposal to Institute Expert Review Panels, 33 S.U. L. REV. 29, 67 (2005). 
59. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
60. Saul M. Kassin, Lorri N. Williams & Courtney L. Saunders, Dirty Tricks of Cross-
Examination: The Influence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
373, 373–74 (1990). 
61. Id. at 376. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 380–81. 
64. Id. 
17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:13 PM 
1342 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1329 
suggests that the use of presumptuous questions is a dirty trick that can 
be used to distort jurors’ evaluations of a witness’s credibility.”65  So in 
cases of presumptive questions, at least, empirical study indicates that 
inappropriate cross-examination may have a dramatic effect on 
factfinders’ perceptions of expert witnesses. 
The problem of adversarial cross-examination techniques, however, 
cannot be confined to inappropriate presumptive questions or to dirty 
tricks alone.  Rather, the basic procedure seems to be inconsistent with 
reasoned assessment of complex scientific material.  Several aspects of 
cross-examination suggest that reliability may be affected by the 
standard methodologies of cross-examination. 
First, cross-examination imposes on the opposing advocate a duty to 
find, explore, and even create doubt about an expert’s opinions.66  This 
duty remains “even if the advocate knows the testimony is accurate.”67  
As a result, vigorous cross-examination, even of accurate testimony, 
may create an artificial “impression of conflict even when little or no 
disagreement exists in practice.”68  To avoid acknowledging weakness on 
cross, an expert may shade his or her testimony to the benefit of the 
client in order to eliminate or reduce doubts about the testimony.69  
Empirical research shows this effect to be pervasive.  In one study, 
seventy-seven percent of experts agreed with the statement, “Lawyers 
manipulate their experts to weaken unfavorable testimony and 
strengthen favorable testimony.”70  A majority also agreed that 
“[l]awyers urge their experts to be less tentative” than they otherwise 
would.71  As a result, expert testimony may convey an artificial and 
unwarranted certainty.  This can profoundly affect the perception of the 
reliability of complex scientific testimony. 
 
65. Id. at 382. 
66. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting 
Norms in the Courtroom, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009, at 41, 50 (finding that “a 
party may shape and select evidence to its benefit”). 
67. Id. at 50 n.46 (emphasis removed). 
68. Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 
JURIMETRICS J. 345, 353–54 (1992); see also Joseph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert 
Witness, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2009, at 63, 67–68 [hereinafter Sanders, Science, 
Law, and Expert Witness]. 
69. Cheng, supra note 8, at 1392 (suggesting that “even a scrupulous expert will shade 
his testimony in his party’s favor”); Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, supra note 41, at 1577. 
70. Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An Empirical 
Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three City Study, 34 
JURIMETRICS J. 193, 201 tbl.3 (1994). 
71. Id. 
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Second, cross-examination often results in formulaic attack 
unrelated to the evidence in question.  In his study of the expert 
testimony in the Bendectin cases, Sanders reported that expert cross-
examination often revolved around the assertion that the expert witness 
fees made an expert a hired gun willing to say anything for the right 
price.72  In addition, the cross can involve minute distinctions between 
deposition testimony and trial testimony, which “rarely involve[] 
fundamental discrepancies that . . . significantly jeopardize the 
witnesses’ direct testimony.”73  Even though it is unhelpful in assisting 
the trier on the merits, this kind of cross-examination seems common.74 
If cross-examination in these areas—attacking credibility on the 
basis of fees or small discrepancies—is universal, commentators suggest 
it has the effect of lowering overall systematic effectiveness.75  In this 
model, cross-examination is merely a “ritual that does little to clarify the 
strengths and weaknesses of a witness’ testimony.”76 
Haack also suggests that the procedures of the adversarial method, 
and the legal standards of Daubert, combine to reduce expert testimony 
to a few “brief verbal formulae” that carry disproportionate weight in 
the legal world, beyond their meaning in the scientific community.77  As 
one example, Haack notes that, in the scientific community, “peer 
review,” is not synonymous with “reliable.”78  However, peer review is 
used by lawyers as one indicator of reliable science, because Justice 
Blackmun in Daubert listed it as a specific factor to consider in 
reliability assessments.79  Haack points out that scientific concepts may 
diverge from their original meaning when used in a legal context, with a 
potential to affect the reliability of the results.80  Reliability can be 
affected by adversarial methods, in particular cross-examination, which 
may feed an expert’s incentive to reduce uncertainty, shade testimony, 
or modify concepts beyond their scientific scope into legal buzzwords. 
So, experts tend to become mouthpieces for the parties who retain 
them, reducing uncertainty, eliminating nuance, and adopting the 
 
72. Sanders, supra note 22, at 47. 
73. Id. at 48. 
74. See Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 836 (citations omitted). 
75. Id. 
76. Sanders, supra note 22, at 47. 
77. Haack, supra note 17, at 19. 
78. Id. at 19–20. 
79. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993)). 
80. Id. (discussing further the issue of “statistical significance”). 
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language of the legal method—rather than the scientific one—in 
presenting their conclusions.81  In this system, the factfinder may 
ultimately conclude that all experts are biased and confused, and thus 
discount them all.82  With no principled way to decide between the 
experts, jurors could decide on other factors rather than scientific 
validity.83  As a result, jury verdicts may not reflect a principled 
assessment of merit, but instead serve a different, outcome-approving 
purpose, providing a pre-packaged justification for whichever verdict or 
decision the decisionmaker wishes to reach.84 
Adversarial procedure may undermine the reliability of complex 
scientific evidence.  This concern is accentuated when adversarial bias 
and selection bias combine in a single case.  Yet if alternative—rather 
than adversarial—legal processes provided an effective final check on 
reliability, then reliability might be less impacted.  Instead of allowing a 
jury decision based on unreliable expertise, the judge may instead 
ensure reliability through vigorous vetting of all science.85  So even in a 
world of selection bias and adversarial methodology, a strong 
gatekeeping system could save reliability by ensuring that only truly 
appropriate scientific evidence will be considered.86  Of course, that 
requires an active judicial role and skilled judicial intervention. 
D.  Judicial Inexperience with Issues Central to Daubert Review 
Underlying the Daubert gatekeeping structure lies an optimistic 
 
81. See Sanders, supra note 22, at 38.  Regarding the distinctions between legal 
factfinding and the scientific method, see Haack, supra note 17, at 7–15; Sanders, Science, 
Law, and Expert Witness, supra note 68, at 70–73.  See generally Sander Greenland, The Need 
for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology and Statistics, 39 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 291, 292–94 (2004) (explaining the conflict between scientific values of uncertainty and 
the limited time available for courts and attorneys). 
82. Robertson, supra note 39, at 192; Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, supra note 41, at 
1578 (“It is also likely that biased testimony contributes to the dilution effects by causing 
jurors to undervalue all expert opinions.”). 
83. Robertson, supra note 39, at 192 (suggesting that “factfinders may also resort to 
more-or-less irrelevant proxies for the truth”); Sanders, supra note 22, at 38–39. 
84. Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, supra note 41, at 1578 (quoting a juror in an asbestos 
case—“The expert testimony was not a real factor in our decision, except in the very 
backhanded senses that it lent medical credence to any result” (quoting Jane Goodman et al., 
What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL, Nov.  1985, at 65, 68)). 
85. Regarding jurors relying on proxies for decisionmaking during a battle-of-the 
experts, see supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
86. See Robertson, supra note 39, at 189 (finding that the current system “allows judges 
to exclude the most biased experts”); Seidemann et al., supra note 58, at 68. 
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assumption about judicial skill in handling complex scientific evidence 
and distinguishing between better and worse scientific work.87  The 
capacity of judges to handle this task has been the subject of major 
debate since 1993, but it is clear that Daubert reliability testing requires 
judges to critically assess the quality of proffered evidence and make 
judgments on scientific merit.88 
Part of the concern is that judges necessarily evaluate the reliability 
of particular scientific methodologies as performed by scientific 
experts,89 but most judges have little, if any, training in any scientific 
discipline.90  Recent empirical research demonstrates that judicial 
inexperience with scientific theory, and with statistics involved in many 
research fields, may threaten the ability of judges to do this 
successfully;91 judges “often lack the tools or expertise to make well-
informed decisions.”92 
If judges lack appropriate scientific literacy, their ability to perform 
their gatekeeping role successfully remains in doubt.93  Empirical data 
suggest these problems can affect admissibility decisions.94 
1. Judges and Their Scientific Background, Use of Statistics 
Empirical study in the area of judges’ backgrounds in—and their 
capacity to undertake review of—scientific and statistical principles casts 
doubt on the assumption that judges will be able to adequately assess 
 
87. See supra Part II.A and notes 19–22, 27 and accompanying text. 
88. David S. Caudill, Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science and 
Undervaluing Advocacy to Construct an Ethical Duty?, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 675, 683 (2011). 
89. See Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone, Admissibility Standards as 
Politics—The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1025, 1040 (2003) 
(quoting Samuel H. Jackson, Comment, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal Billing with Court 
Appointed Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does the Federal Judicial Center 
Agree?, 28 ENVTL. L. 431, 436 (1998)). 
90. Id. at 1040–41(referencing the survey results from Gatowski et al., supra note 6, at 
442). 
91. See Gatowski et al., supra note 6, at 433–44, 450–55. 
92. Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 
1263, 1268 (2007); see also Stephen Breyer, Introduction to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 4 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL 
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE] (“[M]ost judges lack the scientific training that might facilitate the 
evaluation of scientific claims or the evaluation of expert witnesses who make such claims.”). 
93. Gatowski et al., supra note 6, at 454. 
94. Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 926–31 (2003) (citations 
omitted) (identifying, but scrutinizing, recent empirical research and independent evaluation 
of the effect of judicial background on admissibility decisions). 
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underlying scientific methodologies of experts. 
Research shows that most judges have not had extensive 
mathematical or scientific training.95  In her 2007 study, Valerie Hans 
assessed the skill of judges handling expert testimony on mitochondrial 
DNA presented in a hypothetical case.96  The study first demonstrates 
that the judges’ educational background in math and science was similar 
to that of the general jury pool.97  Indeed, compared to the subset of 
jurors who had college degrees, judges had significantly fewer courses in 
math and science in their educational backgrounds.98  Moreover, when 
compared to those jurors whose work involved math or science, Hans 
found the general pool of judges again had completed fewer classes in 
the relevant fields.99  Finally, this study also showed that those judges 
who have the most exposure to math and science in their judicial work 
are not necessarily those who are the most trained in math and 
science.100 
While educational background is one concern, Hans also studied 
whether educational weakness translates into poor application of 
scientific principles.  Hans’s judges assessed expert testimony involving 
mitochondrial DNA,101 and after they were shown a videotape of 
testimony from a mock trial regarding DNA, Hans asked the judges to 
complete eleven true–false questions about the testimony.102  She found 
that the judges outperformed the overall jury pool on two questions, 
while the general jury pool did slightly better on one.103  However, the 
college-educated jury pool scored higher than the judges on three of the 
 
95. See Hans, supra note 6, at 28–31. 
96. Id. at 28–29.  Her study sample included sixty-five judges who volunteered to 
participate after Dr. Hans’s presentation at a “Science for Judges” conference.  Id. at 28.  
These responses were then compared to volunteer jury pool participants selected from New 
Castle County, Delaware.  Id. at 27, 29–31. 
97. Id. at 30 (noting that judges reported an average of 10.29 classes in high school and 
college, compared to 9.72 for the jury pool). 
98. Id. (noting that college-educated juror subsets averaged 14.04 classes in science and 
math, compared to the 10.29 classes for judges). 
99. Id. at 31. 
100. Id. (concluding that “the judges who said they encountered ‘a great deal’ of 
scientific evidence in their judicial work did not report having more of a science and math 
background”). 
101. Id. at 31–38 (explaining and assessing judge and jury comprehension of expert 
testimony, based on questionnaire data). 
102. Id. at 36. 
103. Id. at 36–37. 
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eleven questions, while the judges scored higher on only one.104  Hans’s 
study demonstrates that judges perform worse than college-educated 
jurors in analyzing scientific evidence, which suggests that their capacity 
to perform their gatekeeping function is questionable. 
A second study, performed by Sophia Gatowski and her colleagues 
in 2001, assessed judicial knowledge of basic scientific principles 
involved in Daubert gatekeeping.105  Initially, Gatowski’s study assessed 
the judges’ background in science, and reported that judges themselves 
are split on whether they have adequate background to prepare them 
for their analyses of science in the courtroom.106  When asked about the 
Daubert factors—falsifiability, error rate, peer review and publication, 
and general acceptance—a large majority of judges agreed that those 
factors were useful in assessing expert evidence.107  However, the 
judges—who as a group agreed these concepts were useful in 
determining admissibility for expert evidence—were largely unable to 
provide a proper definition for the factors of falsifiability and error 
rate.108  Based on the data, Gatowski and her colleagues concluded that 
“although judges overwhelmingly endorse the active gatekeeping role 
defined by Daubert, many may lack the scientific literacy necessitated by 
Daubert.”109 
Empirical research in the area of statistics shows similar results.  In 
his 1982 assessment of judges’ handling of statistical data, Dr. Stephen 
Fienberg reports that “[p]erhaps the most difficult task facing the courts 
is the evaluation and assessment of statistical analyses and opinions, 
especially in cases where there is conflicting statistical testimony.”110  
After review of cases involving statistical data, Fienberg concluded that 
the resolution of conflicts between experts in statistical issues is clearly 
 
104. Id. at 37–38. 
105. Gatowski et al., supra note 6, at 438. 
106. Id. at 442 (finding that 52% said background adequately prepared them for the 
range of scientific evidence in court and that 48% said background inadequately prepared 
them). 
107. Id. at 444–47 (finding that 88%, 91%, 92%, and 93% reported each concept useful, 
respectively). 
108. Id. at 444, 447 (concluding that 6% of responses showed an understanding of 
falsifiability and 4% showed an understanding of error rate).  But cf. id. at 447–48 (finding 
that 71% of responses showed an understanding of peer review and 82% showed an 
understanding of general acceptance). 
109. Id. at 453–54. 
110. Stephen E. Fienberg, The Increasing Sophistication of Statistical Assessments as 
Evidence in Discrimination Litigation, 77 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 784, 786 (1982). 
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“beyond the ken of even the most thoughtful and well-trained jurist.”111  
The National Research Council, in 1989, suggested the same in their 
assessment of the handling of statistical evidence in six case studies.112  
So even before Daubert, commentators expressed concern over 
statistical assessment by judges.  Since Daubert, empirical research 
demonstrates that concerns over judicial skill in handling of statistics are 
not unfounded.113 
Since statistics are essential to understanding the underlying 
methodological choices in many types of empirical research, 
unfamiliarity with the methods of statistical research can directly affect 
Daubert gatekeeping reliability choices.114  A brief examination of a 
particular field dependent on statistical analysis—epidemiologic 
evidence—demonstrates the practical effect of this concern over judicial 
training and handling of complex evidence.115 
2. Review of Judicial Handling of Complex Expert Testimony: 
Epidemiologic Risk and the Daubert Standard 
Epidemiology involves the study of “incidence, distribution, and 
etiology of disease in human populations,” and is often involved in 
attempting to show that disease is caused by certain substances or 
toxins.116  Assessment of the relationship between exposure and the 
 
111. Id. at 787. 
112. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 74 (“The case studies reveal that in 
dealing with statistical evidence courts can face substantial problems of institutional 
competence.”). 
113. See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
JUSTICE 291–92 (2006) (stating that judges are not trained and lack the correct background to 
assess science done by the experts in the area); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE 
USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 53–54 (1999) (“In most areas of the law, those 
using science have little or no training in the subject.  This is true for judges, jurors, 
legislators, and to a lesser extent, administrators.”); Lempert, supra note 6, at 278. 
114. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical 
Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777, 797 (2002) (“Those without a basic 
understanding of methods will be less likely to be able to identify the benefits of a particular 
methodological approach and will not be attuned to the drawbacks of the approach.”). 
115. Andrew Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science in the Daubert 
Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
49, 69–80 (2009).  For more detail regarding this field of study, see id. at 53–69. 
116. Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 92, at 333, 335 (defining epidemiology and 
noting the use in proof of causation); see also Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, 
Reference Guide on Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra 
note 92, at 401, 403 (defining toxicology as “‘the study of the adverse effects of chemicals on 
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incidence of disease involves informed analysis of data regarding the 
frequency of disease within the population, and multiple other factors, 
including statistical analysis.117  As a result, statistics often play a crucial 
role in establishing causation in cases involving epidemiologic 
evidence.118 
In several studies of judges’ performance in evaluating complex 
epidemiologic evidence, epidemiologists have rejected the conclusions 
reached by judges in evaluating causation by using statistics on disease.119  
Epidemiologist Dr. Sander Greenland has sharply criticized the 
handling of probability data by judicial gatekeepers assessing causation 
evidence in toxic tort cases.120  He suggests that the courts’ focus on the 
relative risk analysis in epidemiology—often to the exclusion of other 
factors—oversimplifies the complexity of establishing causative effects 
in epidemiology.121  In addition, Greenland noted that relative risk—or 
incidence rate—will often be applied by courts in a manner beyond its 
meaning within the field of epidemiology.122 
In a separate analysis of judicial handling of epidemiological 
evidence, Dr. Jan Beyea and Daniel Berger are also critical.123  Beyea 
and Berger suggest, as Greenland did, that the courts’ assessment of risk 
ratio to establish causation oversimplifies the process of establishing 
 
living organisms’” (quoting David L. Eaton & Curtis D. Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in 
CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 13, 13 (Curtis D. 
Klaassen et al. eds., 5th ed. 1996))). 
117. Green et al., supra note 116, at 375–79 (defining nine factors to assess causation 
relationship). 
118. See id. at 348 (“An association between exposure to an agent and disease exists 
when they occur together more frequently than one would expect by chance.”).  See generally 
id. at 348–63, 369–73 (describing the use of statistics in epidemiology and potential sources of 
error in statistical analysis). 
119. Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert 
Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring/Summer 2001, at 327, 348, 350–57 (explaining how Daubert has created “Judicial 
Junk,” using the misapplication of the doubling-of-risk standard as an example); Sander 
Greenland, Relation of Probability of Causation to Relative Risk and Doubling Dose: A 
Methodologic Error That Has Become a Social Problem, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166, 1169 
(1999). 
120. Greenland, supra note 119, at 1166–69. 
121. Id. at 1166–68. 
122. Id. at 1168–69 (explaining that the “discrepancy between the rate fraction and the 
probability of causation has been overlooked by various experts in the legal as well as the 
scientific community, even though it undermines the rationale for a number of current legal 
standards”). 
123. Beyea & Berger, supra note 119, at 349–50. 
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causation in epidemiologic analysis.124  In addition, reliance on the risk 
ratio provides an unrealistic standard of “pure objectivity” that contrasts 
to other, necessarily more subjective, opinions.125  The problem is that 
nearly all opinions in the area require some level of subjectivity, “based 
on past experience and best professional judgment.”126  In so doing, 
Beyea and Berger expose that judicial use of risk-ratio assessment in the 
courtroom falls well short of epidemiological standards used in the work 
of researchers.127  Thus, Daubert review aspires to ensure that scientists 
bring the same level of intellectual rigor to the courtroom as in their 
scientific work;128 but the previous discussion shows how far the courts 
have fallen short of this goal. 
3. Conclusion on Judicial Handling of Science 
Considering the concerns regarding outlier enhancement and the 
adversarial methodology in assessment of complex science in court,129 
judges must evaluate proffered evidence closely to ensure that expert 
opinion evidence is based on reliable methods.  However, to do so 
requires a detailed understanding of the “subtleties of scientific 
inquiry.”130 
Empirical assessment of judges’ background and ability to apply 
basic scientific and statistical principles suggests that they are not well-
equipped for this task.131  Evaluation of the judicial handling of a specific 
area of complex evidence—epidemiological evidence in toxic torts—
affirms this conclusion, as many epidemiologists reject the methodology 
used by judges in Daubert assessments regarding evidence from their 
field.132 
 
124. Id. at 353–55. 
125. Id. at 355–56. 
126. Id. at 356–57. 
127. Id. at 355–57.  See generally CRANOR, supra note 113, at 283 (“Admissibility 
decisions should be better founded scientifically than at present and comport better with how 
scientists themselves assess evidence.”). 
128. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra Parts II.B–.C. 
130. Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Content-Sensitive 
Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 6 (1996); see also Baumeister & Capone, supra note 89, at 1039–41 (explaining that a 
major criticism of the Daubert standard is that the judge may not be qualified to accurately 
assess scientific evidence or methods). 
131. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1270 & nn.17–18 (citing surveys and case law); Gatowski 
et al., supra note 6, at 454; see also supra Part II.D.1. 
132. Beyea & Berger, supra note 119, at 348–50, 353–57; Greenland, supra note 119, at 
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With evidence demonstrating that judges lack the background to 
assess reliability in many fields, judges may, in cases involving the most 
complex and difficult science, require assistance.  A judge might better 
perform Daubert reliability assessments by either appointing a Rule 706 
independent expert, or performing independent judicial research to 
become more knowledgeable in the scientific field.133 
E.  Current Unused Methodologies to Assist Judges 
In General Electric v. Joiner, Justice Breyer wrote, in his 
concurrence, that “judges are not scientists and do not have the 
scientific training that can facilitate the making of such decisions” on 
subtle and sophisticated matters of scientific methodology, as required 
by Daubert.134  Justice Breyer suggested that judges consider using other 
methodologies to assist them in the evaluation of scientific evidence, 
including the use of independent experts under Rule 706.135  Breyer also 
mentioned other ways judges can further their analysis, including 
employing scientifically trained law clerks, more and more detailed Rule 
16 pretrial conferences, and examination of experts by the court.136 
Unfortunately, these methodologies remain largely unused by 
judges.137  This may threaten reliability of the outcomes reached within 
the system, because, as Justice Breyer suggested, these tools may be 
necessary to assist judges evaluating complex scientific evidence in the 
most difficult cases.138 
1. Independent Judicial Research 
One way for a judge to become a more knowledgeable gatekeeper is 
for him or her to independently research into literature regarding the 
scientific issue in controversy in a pending case.  Even before Daubert, 
commentators suggested independent judicial research as a method to 
 
1166; see also supra Part II.D.2. 
133. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and 
Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 661, 669 (2000) (“Having an expert from the field to discuss the complexities of the 
science greatly should improve judges’ comprehension of the research and relieve their fears 
of making a holding or writing an opinion that delves deeply into the subject.”). 
134. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
135. Id. at 149–50 (citations omitted). 
136. Id. at 149. 
137. See infra Part II.E. 
138. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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overcome judicial weakness in evaluating expert evidence.139  Those 
suggestions continue after Daubert.140  Some also suggest that the 
research should extend beyond investigation into existing studies and 
into the creation of new research in uncertain fields.141 
Evidence suggests that for many judges the active research role is 
beyond their perception of the boundaries of the judicial role and 
adversarial litigation.  In his article Independent Judicial Research in the 
Daubert Age, Edward Cheng evaluated judicial attitudes toward 
independent research by surveying state appellate judges.142  When 
asked about independent consultation with a medical school professor 
or a family physician to look into questions relevant to a pending case, 
judges overwhelmingly rejected the idea.143  Judges were not as uniform 
on independent library research, disagreeing about whether consulting a 
medical journal or a medical treatise was appropriate.144  In conclusion, 
Cheng suggested that “the drafters of the latest revision of the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct should explicitly authorize independent 
research.  Clarification of the evidentiary rules could be helpful as 
well.”145  These changes would promote active judicial research. 
Between the divergence of opinion on its desirability and the mixed 
statutory and legal basis for judges to perform independent research 
under current law, Cheng concludes that while independent judicial 
research may be desirable,146 it remains unlikely to become either 
mandatory or universal.147 
 
139. See, e.g., John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, 
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 497–98 (1986). 
140. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1315. 
141. Christine H. Kim, Essay, Piercing the Veil of Toxic Ignorance: Judicial Creation of 
Scientific Research, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 540, 560, 582–83 (2007) (explaining that “it is time 
for courts to take a more active role in creating research by using the tools they already have 
at their disposal—most significantly, the authority to appoint neutral experts and the broad 
equitable power to craft innovative remedies”). 
142. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1275–76. 
143. Id. at 1278 (finding that 89% of the judges found family physician consultation 
undesirable and 88% found medical school professor consultation undesirable). 
144. Id. at 1276, 1277 figs.1–2 (reporting that 25% of the judges said consulting a medical 
journal was very undesirable and 21% said consulting a medical journal was very desirable, 
whereas nearly 20% of the judges said consulting a medial treatise was very undesirable and 
nearly 18% said consulting a medical treatise was very desirable). 
145. Id. at 1285–86, 1302–03. 
146. Id. at 1315. 
147. Id. at 1277, 1312, 1314 (finding that (1) a significant percentage of judges see 
independent research as very undesirable; (2) mandatory rules are unlikely to result in 
universal behavior; and (3) a discretionary approach is consistent with the overall character of 
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Independent judicial research could—if properly done—assist the 
judge in overcoming some of the inherent problems with Daubert 
gatekeeping, such as weak training in science or a poor ability to apply 
scientific principles.148  But without additional use, it may not provide a 
systematic solution to the Daubert gatekeeping weaknesses. 
2. Independent Experts 
The use of independent experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 
706149 provides one additional and often-suggested solution to the 
problem of judicial inexperience with complex science.150  Yet empirical 
research demonstrates that, similar to independent research, judges 
remain reluctant to appoint independent experts.151  As a result, the 
suggestion of Justice Breyer in Joiner, to use different measures to assist 
judges in evaluating complex science, goes largely unheeded. 
There are, without question, multiple benefits to using independent 
experts under Rule 706, particularly in the area of Daubert review.  
Initially, a judge who lacks background training in science and math—as 
research demonstrates many do152—could call upon an independent 
expert to provide a non-partisan analysis of the expert opinions and 
methodology of the experts retained by the opposing parties.153  This 
could assist the judges in comporting their Daubert reliability decisions 
to the state of current research in the field, beyond the opinions and 
research presented by partisan outliers.154  The judge could, with 
assistance from the expert, see which party’s criticisms of the opposing 
expert actually affect reliability—and thus admissibility under Daubert 
screening—and which are merely adversarial attacks trying to create 
 
the rules). 
148. See supra Part II.D, notes 111–113 and accompanying text (judges lack scientific 
training). 
149. There is also some support for the idea that independent experts can be appointed 
through a judge’s inherent ability to assess evidence under Rule 104.  FED. R. EVID. 104(b); 
Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 n.8 (D. Or. 1996) (using Rule 104, 
not Rule 706, to appoint independent experts). 
150. See Cheng, supra note 8, at 1393–96. 
151. Krafka et al., supra note 7, at 326 tbl.5; see also Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Federal 
and State Trial Judges on the Proffer and Presentation of Expert Evidence, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 
10 tbl.3 (2007). 
152. See supra Part II.D.1. 
153. For this reason, commentators see independent experts as a solution to many of 
these problems.  See supra Parts II.B–.D; see also Robbennolt, supra note 114, at 797. 
154. See supra Part II.B (selection bias of experts favor outliers within field). 
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artificial doubt.155  Finally, if the parties know the judge intends to 
employ a neutral expert to help review reliability, parties are more likely 
to initially offer an opinion within the mainstream of the field, to avoid 
loss of evidence.156 
With these potential benefits, it is not surprising that empirical 
research demonstrates that judges also view independent experts as 
helpful.157  Two studies, one from 1989 and one from 1994, show that a 
large majority of judges agree that an independent expert is likely to be 
helpful in assessing cases.158  But even with the substantial agreement by 
judges that independent experts may be beneficial, research also 
demonstrates that few judges actually use them. 
Two empirical studies published after Daubert show judicial 
reluctance to use independent expert review.159  In their 1994 survey of 
431 federal judges, Cecil and Willging assessed judges’ views about Rule 
706 experts.160  Even though the judges overwhelmingly believed experts 
could be helpful, very few had ever appointed an independent expert.161  
The survey shows that only about 20% of their sample—86 of 431 
judges—had ever appointed an expert under Rule 706.162  Of those who 
had appointed an independent expert, a majority had done so only 
once.163  Of those who had appointed an independent expert, an 
overwhelming majority reported they were satisfied with the result.164 
The Cecil and Willging study results are consistent with the 2002 
study by Carol Krafka and her colleagues.165  In the Krafka study, the 
 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70. 
156. Jurs, supra note 115, at 86 (citing Developments in the Law, Confronting the New 
Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV.  L. REV.  1481, 1590–91 (1995)). 
157. See Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 995; Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., Judges’ 
Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend At 
Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 741 & tbl.3.6 (1989) 
[hereinafter Harris]. 
158. Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 1009 (finding that 87% of the judges responded 
that independent experts would be helpful); Harris, supra note 157, at 741 & tbl.3.6 
(concluding that such support is held by 76% of federal judges and 70% of state judges). 
159. Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 1005 tbl.1; Krafka et al., supra note 7, at 326 tbl.5. 
160. Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 1004 n.33. 
161. Id. at 1004, 1009. 
162. Id. at 1004, 1005 tbl.1. 
163. Id. at 1005 & tbl.1 (finding that 52% of the judges who had appointed an 
independent expert only did so on one occasion). 
164. Id. at 1008 (concluding that 63 of 65 judges were satisfied with their independent 
experts). 
165. See Krafka et al., supra note 7, at 326 tbl.5. 
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judges surveyed rarely used independent experts.166  Only 26% of 
respondents had ever appointed an independent expert.167  That 26% 
figure compared to the 41% who indicated they participated in 
independent research,168 64% who used pretrial hearings to define the 
scope of expert testimony,169 or 77% who used Daubert hearings.170  Cecil 
& Willging’s research and the Krafka study both demonstrate the 
general picture of judicial unwillingness to use independent experts, 
even if believed to be helpful.171 
If judges are reluctant to use a procedure they consider helpful, 
there must be some reason for this.  Cecil and Willging’s report suggests 
several reasons why judges are reluctant to appoint an independent 
expert, including adherence to the adversarial system, inability to 
identify an expert, and desiring to limit Rule 706 for use in 
extraordinary cases only.172  Recent commentators agree with those 
conclusions.  Cheng believes judicial reluctance to appoint relates to 
judicial inability to find the right expert, concerns about maintaining 
adversarial procedures, and a desire to avoid case management delays.173  
Similarly, Robertson cites inability or difficulty in selecting and 
preparing proper experts, and adversarial norms.174 
Despite agreement that independent experts offer solutions to many 
of the problems of judicial review of scientific methodology under 
Daubert, use of Rule 706 experts remains rare.  As currently configured, 
Rule 706 procedures fall short of their potential in assisting judges with 
Daubert reliability assessments. 
 
166. Id. at 326 tbl.5, 327. 
167. See id. at 326 tbl.5. 
168. See id.; see also Cheng, supra note 92, at 1276, 1277 figs.1–2 (detailing survey results 
that many judges are unwilling to independently consult experts); supra notes 144–148 and 
accompanying text. 
169. Krafka et al., supra note 7, at 326 tbl.5. 
170. Id. at 325–26 & tbl.5. 
171. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SPECIAL MASTERS’ 
INCIDENCE AND ACTIVITY: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE’S ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND ITS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPECIAL MASTERS 16 (2000) 
(stating that independent experts are utilized at a rate of 2.7 appointments per 10,000 cases). 
172. Cecil & Willging, supra note 7, at 1015, 1018. 
173. Cheng, supra note 92, at 1271–72. 
174. Robertson, supra note 39, at 200. 
17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:13 PM 
1356 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1329 
F.  Conclusions Regarding Judicial Handling of Science in the Daubert 
Era 
The combined effects of the above difficulties suggest systematic 
weakness in U.S. courts’ assessment of complex science, and so it is 
appropriate to seek methods to resolve these concerns.  In Legal 
Transplants, Alan Watson suggested that, as a general matter, other 
nations’ legal systems provide a natural source for law reform 
methods.175  The foreign experience with science in litigation is a natural 
place to find ways to improve our system, as Haack and others have 
suggested.176 
III.  PROCEDURES USED IN COMPARATIVE LAW ASSESSMENT 
Having reviewed both the methods used by courts in the United 
States to assess reliability of experts, and the problems of those 
methods, the question remains how to resolve those concerns.  An 
examination of foreign systems provides insight into other tested 
procedures to address these weaknesses.  However, before jumping 
directly into the foreign systems, one must first address the 
methodological perspective to be employed. 
There are many different, sometimes incompatible, approaches to 
the study of comparative law.177  The differences are stark, occasionally 
enough to affect the tenor of academic discourse in the field.178  The 
methods discussed in these arguments, and the criticisms thereof, offer 
 
175. WATSON, supra note 9, at 17. 
176. Haack, supra note 17, at 23; Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure, 
supra note 10, at 552. 
177. Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half 
of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 686–90 (2002) (noting that “the subject 
consists of a multitude of bits and pieces that do not add up to a coherent whole”). 
178. Compare Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 823, and John H. 
Langbein, Trashing The German Advantage, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 763, 764–65, 784 (1988) 
(stating that the Allen et al. article misrepresents his previous work, and further calling its 
response “thoroughly untrustworthy” and a “reckless trashing” of his work), with Ronald J. 
Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer 
Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 707–08, 761 (1988) 
[hereinafter Allen et al., A Plea] (responding to 1985 Langbein article on experts in Germany 
and stating, “We are also convinced, however, that to be useful comparative analysis must 
proceed beyond platitudes and generalities to address instead the realities of the systems 
being compared”), and Ronald J. Allen, Idealization and Caricature in Comparative 
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 807 (1988) [hereinafter Allen, Idealization and 
Caricature] (stating that Langbein failed to respond to criticism of his work, but rather only 
responded to discredit critics). 
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insight into proper methodological choices for analysis of experts. 
As a starting point, the traditional approach to comparative analysis 
is functionalism.  In functionalist theory, a legal problem is not reviewed 
through the assessment of the geographic entity or its sociological 
context; rather, the focus is on a problem common to several nations 
and on investigation into legal responses to the problem.179  A 
functionalist necessarily adopts several underlying premises: first, that 
law is “an instrument for channeling human behavior and . . . answers to 
social needs or interests;” second, that problems addressed by disparate 
legal systems “are similar or even identical across different . . . 
systems;”180 and third, that legal systems “solve[] these problems by quite 
different means though very often with similar results.”181  With these 
principles, a functionalist may address a legal problem between nations, 
offering cross-national insight. 
With this methodology, functionalists may promote development of 
the law through the adoption of institutions or procedures from foreign 
systems.182  The development of law through a functionalist process 
therefore includes several steps: identifying a common problem; 
examining solutions in different systems; and adoption of a foreign 
solution that addresses the problem.183  With this methodology, 
functionalist assessment of varying legal systems can become a source 
 
179. Oliver Brand, Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of 
Comparative Legal Studies, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 409–10 (2007); Michele Graziadei, The 
Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 
100, 102, 111 (Pierre LeGrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003) (citing INTRODUCTION TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 34–35); Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality 
Seriously in Comparative Constitutional Law: Insights from Comparative Politics and 
Comparative Political Economy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 636 (2008) (quoting 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 34); Ruti Teitel, Comparative 
Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570, 2574 (2004) (book review). 
180. Brand, supra note 179, at 409–10. 
181. Graziadei, supra note 179, at 102 (quoting INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW, supra note 1, at 34). 
182. See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal 
Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 502–03 (1995); William Ewald, Comparative 
Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1979 (1995) 
[hereinafter Ewald, Try a Rat]. 
183. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 179, at 409–10; see also WATSON, supra note 9, 95–101; 
Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 723, 726–730 (2009) (stating that the similarities between the 
German and Japanese civil codes may be explained as “the Japanese government’s choice to 
rely on th[o]se Western models to change the law of Japan”). 
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for legal reforms.184  Along these lines, the U.S. Supreme Court has often 
noted the usefulness of foreign law in domestic interpretation issues.185  
Justice Breyer has supported this approach: “Willingness to consider 
foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation 
that from its birth has given a decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind.”186 
Functionalism does have its critics, however.  Mirjan Damaška notes 
that the transplantation of legal structures from one nation to another—
often a part of functionalist reform—often has unintended 
consequences: “In seeking inspiration for change, it is perhaps natural 
for lawyers to go browsing in a foreign law boutique.  But it is an illusion 
to think that this is a boutique in which one is always free to purchase 
some items and reject others.”187 
But Damaška’s criticism reveals an even larger point: the underlying 
premises of functionalism may not survive critical appraisal.  Critics of 
the functional approaches to comparative methodology may operate 
from several perspectives.  Among these, the culturalists reject 
assessment of legal methodology independent of the society and unique 
characteristics that created it.188  As one commentator notes, culturalist 
 
184. WATSON, supra note 9, at 118; Bryan, supra note 9, at 538; Mirjan Damaška, The 
Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 
AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 851–52 (1997); Markesinis, supra note 9, at 21. 
185. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–77 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) (examining United 
Nations, United Kingdom, and other nations’ laws to assess the use of juvenile death penalty; 
stating that “the Court has [previously] referred to the laws of other countries and to 
international authorities as instructive”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73, 576 (2003) 
(Kennedy, J.) (assessing European case law to examine sodomy law); Foster v. Florida, 537 
U.S. 990, 992–93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (assessing international decisions on delay in 
death penalty); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases 
which analyzed foreign law to interpret the Constitution, inter alia, Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8, 718–19 n.16 (1997)); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
976–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (1996) (citing examples of Switzerland, Germany, and the 
European Union, stating that “their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the 
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 n.22 (1982) (citing 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)). 
186. Knight, 528 U.S. at 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
187. Damaška, supra note 184, at 852; see also Langbein, The Influence of Comparative 
Procedure, supra note 10, at 552–53. 
188. Brand, supra note 179, at 412–13, 428; see also Vlad F. Perju, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
170, 171 (2009) (reviewing THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry 
ed., 2006)) (discussing comparative law polarization between perspectives of “borrowing” and 
“migration”).  See generally Graziadei, supra note 179, at 126 (explaining the recent 
emergence of culturalists). 
17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:13 PM 
2012] BALANCING LEGAL PROCESS 1359 
methodology requires a foreign system to be analyzed 
 
from the inside and in socio-cultural context; and those who 
engage in something less are in essence practicing cognitive 
control over their readers and deluding themselves in the 
process. . . .  [T]he researcher must always delve beyond judicial 
decisions, doctrinal writings and the black letter law of code and 
statute and reach into the ill-defined region of “deeper 
structures” where law perhaps meets philosophy, sociology, and 
social culture.189 
 
In a culturalist assessment then, only immersion within the greater 
contexts of the law allows for beneficial insight into foreign systems.190 
Other critics of the functionalist methodology pointedly reject the 
assumptions underlying functionalist theory,191 which they see as 
oversimplifying issues.192  Some see the weaknesses of functionalism as 
rooted in the problem that systems cannot be properly understood when 
unmoored from the philosophical bases of the law.193  Other 
commentators criticize the traditional emphasis placed on a small 
number of systems, usually the “common law” and “civil law” Western 
European systems.194  Another criticism of functionalism is that the 
assumption that problems are similar across different systems cannot be 
verified.195  In combination, the anti-functionalists argue, these concerns 
lead to the conclusion that traditional comparative scholarship has often 
been shallow and unhelpful, if not misleading or simply wrong.196 
The anti-functionalist criticisms offer appropriate insights into the 
limits of functionalist theory.  However, the responses of commentators 
to the anti-functionalist arguments forcefully reject many criticisms as 
 
189. Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of 
Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 266 (2005). 
190. See Allen, Idealization and Caricature, supra note 178, at 788; Allen et al., A Plea, 
supra note 178, at 707–08; Ewald, Try a Rat, supra note 182, at 1977. 
191. For the underlying assumptions of functionalism, see supra text accompanying 
notes 179–181. 
192. Ewald, Try a Rat, supra note 182, at 1963–65 (citations omitted) (cataloguing 
criticisms of traditional comparative analysis). 
193. Id. at 1896; Palmer, supra note 189, at 266. 
194. Brand, supra note 179, at 414. 
195. Id. at 417. 
196. Ewald, Try a Rat, supra note 182, at 1968 (containing criticisms of traditional 
comparative law). 
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unrealistic and unhelpful.  Palmer rejects the idea that foreign systems 
can only be assessed by someone totally immersed in foreign culture. 
I believe these strictures (of immersion critics) are, in part, based on 
unrealistic assumptions that threaten to make the comparative law 
enterprise quite impractical.  They establish standards of research that 
are generally unattainable, which means that no project is worth 
beginning, or if it was begun or accomplished, will not be safe from 
rigorous critique.  And this only increases comparative law’s reputation 
for being exotic and forbidding.197 
Accordingly, Palmer suggests that practical forms of research should 
be considered entirely appropriate.198  This pragmatic approach rejects 
the “‘nearly insurmountable methodological hurdle’” of culturalist 
methods.199 
Other commentators agree.  In his analysis of the culturalist 
approach, Bradley Bryan writes that indeed cultural explanations often 
involve a uniquely American approach to law, but that does not mean 
there is nothing we can learn from civil law methods.200  Bryan argues 
that it is appropriate to examine the fundamental differences and 
similarities between systems, even if we cannot do an in-depth study of 
the rich and complex histories of systems.201 
John Langbein goes a step further than Palmer or Bryan.  He attacks 
the culturalists’ ulterior motive of shielding the American system from 
criticism based on comparative assessments.202  He goes so far to say that 
arguments of American exceptionalism that defend the status quo 
against comparative assessment based on “cultural differences” are not 
based on an academic distinction, but rather demonstrate a tautological 
belief system: “What [this] argument boils down to is the claim that we 
Americans cannot aspire to such improvements because we are 
Americans and they are Germans.”203  Langbein, rejecting the 
 
197. Palmer, supra note 189, at 266. 
198. Id. at 264, 266. 
199. Id. at 265 (quoting Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the 
“Rectification of Names” in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19, 25 (1996)). 
200. Bryan, supra note 9, at 535–36, 539, 542, 554. 
201. Id. at 543; see also Graziadei, supra note 179, at 113 (discussing the role of 
functionalism as complementary to cultural approaches and noting that diversity in 
approaches is beneficial). 
202. John H. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
& COMP. L 41, 48–49 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, Cultural Chauvinsim]. 
203. Id. at 45. 
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limitations imposed by immersion theorists, assures us that cross-
cultural comparison from the functionalist perspective offers 
appropriate suggestions to the improvement of the American system.204 
Even if those who counter the criticisms of functionalist theory—
such as Bryan, Langbein, or Palmer—fail to convince, perhaps the focus 
can shift from theoretical generalities to the particular problem being 
addressed.  Since functionalism retains its position as the dominant 
ideology of the comparative law realm,205 a functionalist approach must 
be more persuasive in some areas, even if it is less in other areas of the 
law.  If that is true, the subject of experts fits squarely within the 
boundaries of the domain where a functionalist approach is appropriate.  
In particular, this Article examines four characteristics leading to this 
conclusion. 
First, the function of and rules for experts discussed here involves 
private law rather than constitutional or public law concerns.  Even 
critics of functionalism recognize that areas of private law such as tort, 
contract, and family law are areas that lend themselves more easily to 
cross-national comparison than public or constitutional areas,206 which 
are more closely associated with the unique historical and cultural 
context of the nation.207  More succinctly, Ruti Teitel notes, 
“Historically, functionalism assumed that legal problems could simply 
be excised from their political context, a notion easy to sustain in private 
law.”208  Teitel continues by saying that constitutional or public law was 
beyond the purview of traditional functionalism.209  Alan Watson further 
suggests that “no area of private law can be designated as being 
extremely resistant to change as a result of foreign influence.”210  It 
seems that private law issues—such as experts—are more likely to be 
proper for functionalist assessment. 
A second reason that expert witness issues are likely to be 
appropriate for functionalist analysis is the narrow nature of the issue 
being addressed.  In general, commentators note that narrow problems 
 
204. See id. at 41–42; see also Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 825 
(suggesting reforms to American judicial factfinding based on German examples). 
205. Brand, supra note 179, at 408. 
206. See WATSON, supra note 9, at 98; Ewald, Try a Rat, supra note 182, at 1987; Teitel, 
supra note 179, at 2575. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 188–191. 
208. Teitel, supra note 179, at 2576. 
209. Id. 
210. WATSON, supra note 9, at 98 (emphasis added). 
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and institutions offer comparative scholars with readily-accessible areas 
for study.211  Scholars starting their research may, because of this, look to 
a discrete area familiar to the scholar that is also present within the 
foreign system.212  By examining a familiar but narrow issue, that 
comparative scholar’s analysis may “lead to reflection—if not cross-
fertilization of ideas and solutions” shaped by differences in structure 
from the foreign system.213  Such differences may offer solutions that are 
“‘packaged’ . . . for exportation,” and tailored to resolve narrow issues.214  
Expert reform fits this template, as a discrete transportable issue, and 
“the most obvious of the European-inspired improvements that 
Americans could make in their civil procedure.”215 
A third reason why functionalist approaches seem appropriately 
applied to expert witness concerns is not as much an assessment of 
functionalism alone, but a response to those criticisms leveled against it.  
If immersion theorists and other anti-functionalists criticize 
functionalism partially based on attacking its underlying assumptions,216 
then a demonstration that those assumptions are valid may blunt that 
criticism.  Expert concerns are one area where the functionalist 
assumption of similarity of problems appears valid.217  Concerns in the 
proper use of experts in complex litigation are not limited to solely one 
national legal system, but are common to many.  The common concerns 
include: how to balance expertise and legal process, how to preserve the 
role of the factfinder when necessity dictates the need for specialized 
evidence, and how to ensure the quality of the evidence being presented 
on an issue factfinders do not themselves know.218  If these problems are 
 
211. Michael Coester & Basil Markesinis, Liability of Financial Experts in German and 





215. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure, supra note 10, at 552. 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 191–196. 
217. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
218. See CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 364–67 (2004) 
[hereinafter GOODMAN, JUSTICE] (discussing changes to Japanese expert witness system to 
address previous weaknesses in expert witness role and operation); MIKE REDMAYNE, 
EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 206–11 (2001) (reviewing and criticizing French 
methods for expert selection and role of experts in criminal litigation); Ian Freckelton, 
Judicial Attitudes Toward Scientific Evidence: The Antipodean Experience, 30 U.C.  DAVIS L. 
REV. 1137, 1149–50 (1997) (explaining that balancing the role of judge, jury, and expert in 
cases involving complex evidence is a difficult problem, and has a long history in Australia 
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similar between systems—and they appear to be—then the criticism of 
the anti-functionalists that problems cannot be assessed without detailed 
cultural or sociological assessments is unconvincing.  Expert witness 
issues do appear to fit within the confines of appropriate applications of 
functionalist theory. 
A final reason why functionalism may be appropriate to assess 
expert witness procedures involves the underlying basis of much expert 
witness testimony: that the scientific method aspires to achieve universal 
and objective truth, and so is transnational in that sense.219  The scientific 
method is often defined by “universalism, communism, 
disinterestedness, [and] organized skepticism.”220  To these ends, 
commentators note that “[i]t offends science, which prides itself on both 
internationalism of cooperation and universality of truth, if its truths 
and authority cannot flow freely across borders.”221  Of course, the goal 
of science is to maximize universality and precision, not to achieve it.222  
Even so, the subject matter similarity of expert evidence allows isolation 
of the legal structures in a way unavailable for, or more complicated in, 
differing subject areas.  As such, the functionalist transnational 
assessment of problem-solving techniques seems particularly 
informative in this area. 
 
and New Zealand); Petra van Kampen & Hans Nijboer, Daubert in the Lowlands, 30 U.C.  
DAVIS L. REV. 951, 970–88 (1997) (assessing the admissibility of expert testimony in complex 
tort litigation in the Netherlands); Sanders, Science, Law, and Expert Witness, supra note 68, 
at 73, 74 & n.53 (finding that when serving as an expert in litigation, expert witnesses must 
balance their duty to scientific convention with their duty to the court; United Kingdom civil 
procedure specifically states the expert’s duty to the court will outweigh its duty to the 
retaining party); Sven Timmerbeil, The Role of Expert Witnesses in German and U.S. Civil 
Litigation, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 163, 179–85 (2003) (describing the role of judge 
and expert in German court and offering criticisms of the balance of these roles in German 
civil litigation).  Many of these examples will be discussed in detail infra Parts IV.A–.E. 
219. Regarding science as a universal methodology, see Sanders, Science, Law, and 
Expert Witness, supra note 68, at 88 (scientific methods always include skepticism, empirical 
assessment, intellectual honesty, and disinterestedness); and see also infra note 217 and 
accompanying text. 
220. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 270 (1973).  For a general description of these “imperatives,” 
see id. at 270–78. 
221. Charles Bazerman, How Does Science Come to Speak in the Courts?  Citations, 
Intertexts, Expert Witnesses, Consequential Facts, and Reasoning, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter 2009, at 91, 119. 
222. Peter A. Alces, Contract Reconceived, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 39, 40 (2002) (quoting 
PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE, RECONSTRUCTING SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS: THOMAS S. 
KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 23 (Alexander T. Levine trans., 1993)) (suggesting that 
science seeks maximum precision and universality). 
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Combining all four considerations—expert witnesses contained 
within private law, the separation of a discrete issue from larger 
concerns, commonality of problems of balancing scientific expertise and 
legal process, and the basic universality of scientific inquiry—the 
conclusion is that functionalist methodology is an appropriate means to 
examine expert witnesses between foreign systems.  This is not to say it 
is the sole method, but only to say that it is an appropriate and 
beneficial method to consider in reform efforts looking for possible ways 
to improve systematic handling of experts; indeed, “[a] deeper 
understanding of the theory and practice of another system” provides an 
opportunity to “allow us to reflect more thoroughly on the possible 
consequences of pursuing change in our own system.”223  As such, the 
systems of other major industrialized nations in handling experts should 
offer insight into the balancing of legal process and scientific expertise 
within the U.S. system. 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF OTHER NATIONS’ HANDLING OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES IN LITIGATION 
All major legal systems must manage the competing concerns of 
legal process and scientific knowledge, preserving the role of the 
factfinder while ensuring access to reliable scientific expertise.  How 
they do so may prove instructive to the American legal system, 
consistent with Haack’s suggestion to seek solutions to Daubert’s 
weaknesses in the handling of expert witnesses in other nations.224 
To assess whether we may find useful tools in the foreign examples, 
this Article will assess procedures that apply to experts in complex tort 
cases225 in the common-law systems of Canada and the United 
Kingdom,226 and in the civil law systems of Germany and Japan.227  For 
each nation, this Article will describe the role and selection of experts, 
the methods used to ensure scientific reliability for expert evidence, and 
the preservation of the role of the factfinder from undue influences of 
the expert.  Then, it will be possible to suggest which methodologies 
offer promise to address the weaknesses of the current management of 
 
223. See Kinley & Rose, supra note 10, at 16 (discussing potential change to Australia’s 
system). 
224. Haack, supra note 17, at 23. 
225. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
226. See infra Parts IV.A–.B. 
227. See infra Parts IV.D–.E. 
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experts within the Daubert framework of the United States.228 
A.  Canada 
The Canadian system is a useful starting point for assessing other 
nations’ handling of complex evidence in court, since the basic structure 
of tort liability and the basic test for judicial review of complex evidence 
will be familiar to the American audience.  Yet, some significant 
differences in both substantive and procedural law provide an 
interesting contrast with the Daubert regime in the United States. 
1. Basic Admissibility Standards Under Canadian Law 
Historically, Canadian courts have used a minimal standard for 
admissibility of expert evidence, evaluating solely whether the evidence 
would be helpful to the jury.229  A judge deciding the admissibility of 
expert testimony under this prior system would merely decide whether 
the jury would be able to decide the issue for themselves, and if not, 
then a properly qualified expert could testify on the issue.230  Before 
1994, Canadian courts consistently rejected Frye-type assessment of 
reliability in use in the United States until 1993.231  However, in 1994, the 
Canadian Supreme Court issued a watershed opinion that significantly 
changed the previous standard for admission of expert testimony. 
In R. v. Mohan, the Canadian Supreme Court adopted a four-part 
test for the admission of proposed expert testimony.232  Explicitly 
rejecting the prior standard of helpfulness, the court determined that 
admission is measured by the following: relevance of the expert 
evidence, its “necessity in assisting the trier of fact,” “the absence of any 
 
228. See infra Part V. 
229. Sidney N. Lederman, Judges as Gatekeepers: The Admissibility of Scientific 
Evidence Based on Novel Theories, in SPECIAL LECTURES 2003: THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
218, 221 (Law Society of Upper Canada, eds., 2004) (citing Fisher v. R., [1961] O.W.N. 94 
(Can. Ont. C.A.), aff’d [1961] S.C.R. 535 (Can.)). 
230. Lederman, supra note 226, at 221. 
231. Sophia I Gatowski et al., The Diffusion of Scientific Evidence: A Comparative 
Analysis of Admissibility Standards in Australia, Canada, England, and the United States, and 
Their Impact on Social and Behavioural Sciences, 4 EXPERT EVIDENCE 86, 87–88 (1996) 
(citing R. v. Beland, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 (Can.) (Wilson, J., dissenting); R. v. Johnston, 1992 
CarswellOnt 78 paras. 63–82 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.)); see also P. Brad Limpert, Beyond the 
Rule in Mohan: A New Model for Assessing the Reliability of Scientific Evidence, 54 U. 
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 65, 79–80 (1996).  But see R. v. Medvedew, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 208, 221 
(Can. Man. C.A.) (O’Sullivan, J.A., dissenting) (writing that “to me [the Frye standard] 
makes sound sense and expresses a view in accord with the principles of the common law”)). 
232. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 20 (Can.). 
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exclusionary rule,” and whether there is “a properly qualified expert.”233  
As a result, expert admissibility decisions need more rigorous 
assessment than before.234  While not explicitly citing Daubert, Mohan 
included reliability assessment as part of the determination of relevance 
within the four factors.235  For those expert opinions that are considered 
to be a “novel scientific theory or technique,” the court suggested a 
more rigorous test requiring “special scrutiny” to ensure reliability.236  
Even with the four-part test, Mohan raised as many questions as it 
resolved. 
In the years immediately following Mohan, Canadian courts made 
reliability assessments in a variety of ways.237  Some courts applied 
factors similar to Daubert—looking at peer review, general acceptance, 
and known or potential rate of error.238  Other courts applied vaguer 
standards.239  Still others applied a fourteen-factor reliability test from a 
precise inquiry predating Mohan, in R v. Johnston.240  While Mohan 
contained language clarifying the standard for judicial gatekeeping in 
Canada, its application remained uncertain following the decision. 
The Canadian Supreme Court clarified the gatekeeping standard in 
the 2000 case of R. v. J.-L.J.241  In R. v. J.-L.J., a criminal case tried 
 
233. Id. 
234. Lederman, supra note 226, at 221–22; Paul Mitchell & Renu Mandhane, The 
Uncertain Duty of the Expert Witness, 42 ALTA. L. REV. 635, 641 (2005) (suggesting that “it is 
now more difficult to have expert testimony admitted in both criminal and civil 
proceedings”). 
235. Robert S. Harrison & Emily E. Marrocco, The Nuts and Bolts of Expert Evidence, 
25 ADVOC. Q. 157, 159–60 (2002); Lederman, supra note 227, at 222; David Paciocco, Taking 
a “Goudge” out of Bluster and Blarney: An “Evidence-Based Approach” to Expert Testimony, 
13 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 135, 147 (2009) (“Traditionally, ‘reliability’ of the expert’s theories or 
techniques has been tested under the ‘relevance’ branch of the Mohan inquiry.”). 
236. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 25. 
237. See Limpert, supra note 231, at 83 (citing Petro-Can. v. Can.-Nfld. Offshore Petrol. 
Bd., [1995] 127 D.L.R. 4th 483, 504–05 (Can. Nfld. S.C.); and R. v. J.E.T., 1994 CarswellOnt 
3370, para. 75–87 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (WL)). 
238. J.E.T., 1994 CarswellOnt 3370 para. 75 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc, 
509 U.S. 579, 589–94 (1993)). 
239. Lederman, supra note 226, at 223–25 (citing R. v. Terceira (1998), 38 O.R. 3d 175 
(Can. Ont. C.A.) and concluding that the Judge “decline[d] to enumerate a specific structure 
that must be adhered to in every case,” leaving it to court discretion for reliability analysis in 
each case). 
240. R. v. Johnston, [1992] 12 C.R. 4th 99 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Lederman, supra note 226, 
at 225.  Limpert states the Johnston standard, with its 14-point analysis, “may be somewhat 
helpful to a judge but it sets out a confusing, incoherent, and redundant legal standard.”  
Limpert, supra note 231, at 81–82. 
241. R. v. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600 (Can.). 
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without a jury, the court emphasized that the gatekeeping role is 
essential to keep out improper expert evidence and avoid its distorting 
effects on a trial242—and that remained true for cases with a judicial 
factfinder as well as jury cases.243  In addition to stressing the importance 
of gatekeeping, the court in R. v. J.-L.J. further clarified the reliability 
test for experts who testify to a new or novel scientific theory, subject to 
“special scrutiny” under Mohan.244  For such evidence, the court thought 
it especially important that courts ensure that improper evidence stays 
out of the case, by assessing reliability under the Daubert factors: 
testing, “peer review and publication,” “known or potential rate of 
error,” and general acceptance.245  In analyzing these factors, judges will 
determine if the new or novel science is reliable enough for 
consideration by the factfinder.246 
Through the establishment of a test for gatekeeping in Mohan, and 
the clarification of that standard for novel science in R. v. J.-L.J., the 
Canadian Supreme Court ensured trial judges assess scientific reliability 
of expert evidence prior to admission. 
2. Application of the Standard—Role of Jury, Complex Case Law 
So, since 1994, the Canadian Supreme Court has rejected the 
previous standard of helpfulness.  Analysis of the scope, purposes, and 
application of the Canadian standard will help assess whether the system 
works, and also its similarity to gatekeeping in the United States. 
When establishing uniform rules for Canadian gatekeeping, one 
initial consideration involves the different circumstances of civil jury 
trials in that nation.  In Canada, trial by jury remains largely confined to 
criminal law cases, as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.247  In civil cases, jury trials are rare, occurring only in some 
 
242. Id. paras. 28–29, 61 (internal citations omitted). 
243. Id. para. 25 (noting the need to “preserve and protect the role of the trier of fact—
the judge or the jury” (emphasis added)); id. para. 56 (holding expert opinions to be outside 
the knowledge of the judge or jury and that the opinions must “‘enable the trier of fact to 
appreciate the matters in issue due to their technical nature’” (quoting R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 
S.C.R. 9, 23 (Can.))). 
244. Id. paras. 33–35 (citing  Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 25; Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993)). 
245. Id. para. 33. 
246. See id. paras. 34–35. 
247. See Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1999, at 141, 146–47 (quoting Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms § 11(f), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
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provinces and for certain claims.248  Even in provinces where civil jury 
trials are generally permitted, the judge may remove a case from 
consideration by a jury on the basis of significant complexity.249  With 
these rules, a trial regarding a civil claim based on complex scientific 
evidence is extraordinarily rare or nonexistent, and so one could 
conclude gatekeeping as established by Mohan is unnecessary since the 
court can consider, as factfinder, the ultimate conclusion.  This unified 
approach is how complex evidence assessment occurs in the United 
Kingdom.250  For Canadian courts, however, the gatekeeping function 
remains significant and important at the admission stage.251  The reason 
gatekeeping remains important, even in the absence of a civil jury trial, 
is the purposes it is intended to serve. 
Gatekeeping clearly serves the function of ensuring that only 
reliable evidence gets considered at trial.  Since only reliable evidence 
will be admitted, expert evidence is intended to help reach an accurate 
conclusion based on the current state of science.252  Unreliable evidence 
is excluded, then, to ensure that it does not distort the factfinding 
 
Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)). 
248. W.A. Bogart, “Guardian of Civil Rights . . . Medieval Relic”: The Civil Jury in 
Canada, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1999, at 305, 306–07 (finding that some provinces 
prohibit jury trial, while some allow it for certain claims—for example, Alberta allows jury 
trial for tort claims and British Columbia and Ontario allow jury trials with certain 
exceptions). 
249. Id. at 307–08 (citing Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/09, R. 12–6(5) 
(Can.), permitting a judge to hear the trial without a jury when the case involves scientific 
investigation or is complex or intricate). 
250. See infra Part IV.B. 
251. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, paras. 25, 28–29 (intending gatekeeping to “preserve 
and protect the role of the trier of fact—the judge or the jury” (emphasis added)); Taylor v. 
Liong, 2007 CarswellBC 347 (Can. B.C.S.C.)(WL) (emphasizing gatekeeping role as 
envisioned by J.-L.J.); Taylor, 2007 CarswellBC 347, para. 197 (noting difference between 
threshold reliability and ultimate reliability); Chan v. Erin Mills Town Centre Corp., 2005 
CarswellOnt 6741, paras. 27, 31–33 (Can. Ont. S.C.)(WL) (internal citations omitted). 
252. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 20–21, 24 (Can.) (finding that admission of expert 
evidence is based on the assessment of reliability versus effect to ensure that the probative 
value is worth its cost on the trial process and is reviewed for the potential to distort the 
factfinding process); Gatowski et al., supra note 231, at 88; Vidmar, supra note 247, at 166–67 
(“An important goal of the Mohan decision was to prevent juries from being influenced by 
unreliable expert evidence . . . .”); see also J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, para. 29 (expert 
evidence as part of the search for truth); Graham D. Glancy & John M.W. Bradford, The 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Canada, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 350, 351 
(2007) (nothing that the Mohan court “stated that expert evidence should not be admitted 
when there is a danger that it will be misused or distort the fact-finding process”). 
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process with an invalid conclusion.253  The gatekeeping function also 
underscores the role of the expert vis-à-vis the fact finder.  Canadian 
courts repeatedly emphasize that an expert is to assist in finding the 
facts, but not to “usurp the functions of the trier of fact.”254 
Two examples of courts applying the standards from Mohan and R. 
v. J.-L.J. underscore these purposes.  In a 2005 case, Chan v. Erin Mills 
Town Centre, the Ontario Supreme Court assessed expert evidence 
regarding a link between the plaintiff’s post-polio syndrome and a slip-
and-fall accident at the defendant’s store.255  The court noted the 
concern that reliability assessment in civil cases, when the judge sits 
alone as factfinder, lacks the rationale it has in the case of jury trials, 
where a jury may be overwhelmed by the expert’s testimony.256  While 
noting the difference, the court did not dismiss the gatekeeping function 
or deny that gatekeeping is mandated by Canadian law; it instead 
concluded that the gatekeeping standard had been met for the proposed 
expert.257 
In 2007, in Taylor v. Liong, the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
faced the issue of admission of expert medical testimony claiming 
multiple sclerosis had been caused by an automobile accident.258  
Initially, the court noted the Mohan test as the standard for the 
assessment of admissibility under Canadian law.259  Taylor cites Chan to 
underscore the importance of gatekeeping in the context of both 
 
253. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 29 (searching for the truth excludes expert evidence 
that may “distort the fact finding process”); Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 24; see also STEPHEN 
T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO 470–71 (2008) 
(suggesting that “the judge must bear the heavy burden of being the ultimate gatekeeper in 
protecting the system from unreliable expert evidence”), available at http://www.attorney 
general.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/index.html. 
254. Glancy & Bradford, supra note 252, at 351–52; J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 56 
(purpose of expert evidence “is not to substitute the expert for the trier of fact”); Mohan, 
[1994] 2 S.C.R. at 24 (stating that experts should not usurp the functions of the trier of fact); 
Taylor, 2007 CarswellBC 347, para. 183 (stating that it is improper for experts overtake 
judicial functions); Chan, 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, para. 35; R. v. Dimitrov (2003), 68 O.R. 3d 
641, para. 56 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (noting that the lower court held that the expert evidence in 
question risked distorting the factfinding process, especially due to its weak relevance and 
reliability); see also Lederman, supra note 226, at 241–42 (noting concerns about usurpation 
of factfinder by either expert or by the judge). 
255. Chan, 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, paras. 1–4. 
256. Id. paras. 30–31. 
257. Id. para. 33. 
258. Taylor v. Liong, 2007 CarswellBC 347, paras. 1, 3 (Can. B.C. S.C.) (WL). 
259. Id. paras. 58–60. 
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criminal and civil cases.260  The court then emphasized the need to be 
wary of overuse of experts, and preserving the role of expert as distinct 
from the role of judge or factfinder.261  Finally, the court determined that 
in the case of novel science, the R. v. J.-L.J. factors are helpful in 
evaluating novel science.262  In applying these tests, the court held that 
one expert proffered by the plaintiff failed to meet proper standards for 
reliability and should not testify.263  Thus, the court assessed the scientific 
merit and background of the expert opinion to reach its conclusions in 
both Taylor and Chan.264 
Ultimately, the Canadian tests appear to operate similarly to the 
American Daubert standard, both assessing minimal reliability of the 
evidence prior to admission.265 
3. Differences from the American Daubert System 
If the Canadian standard operates in a roughly similar way to the 
American test under Daubert, then it is important to examine the 
distinctions between Canadian and U.S. gatekeeping. 
Substantively, the Canadian system creates an explicit distinction 
between new and novel scientific theories requiring special scrutiny and 
those passing under the standard Mohan test.266 In Daubert, general 
acceptance is one of the reliability factors, but is not written so that all 
non-novel science is subject to lesser scrutiny.267  Of course, Daubert 
assessments of new, untested, or cutting-edge theories may be more 
elaborate, but the same factors have been approved for all gatekeeping 
questions.268  With Mohan and R. v. J.-L.J., the differentiation between 
new and other scientific evidence allows for an explicit recognition that 
 
260. Id. paras. 63–64 (citing Chan, 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, para. 31). 
261. Id. paras. 66–73 (citing R. v. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, paras. 25, 28, 30, 33, 34 
(Can.)). 
262. Id. para. 72 (citing J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, para. 33). 
263. Id. para. 189 (stating that the expert’s opinion lacked reliability due to “logical 
frailty and lack of coherence.”). 
264. Id. para. 74–176; Chan v. Erin Mills Town Ctr., 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, paras. 46–77 
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of Justice)(WL). 
265. Vidmar, supra note 247, at 166 (concluding that the Canadian Mohan test is 
“roughly similar” to the tests used in Daubert and Joiner). 
266. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, para. 35; R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 25 (Can.).  See 
text accompanying notes 233, 241–243 (describing Mohan test). 
267. See text accompanying notes 25–27 (describing that reliability factors apply to all 
forms of expert evidence). 
268. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). 
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this type of evidence will be subject to special scrutiny.269 
Beyond the substantive tests, Canadian courts offer some procedural 
tools not utilized by American courts in order to assist gatekeepers and 
factfinders assess expert evidence.  One of these involves the courts 
expressing an 
 
increasing recognition . . . that experts owe . . . a fiduciary duty to 
the courts and tribunals they seek to enlighten; it is expected that 
experts will make every effort to give their evidence objectively 
and independently of the interests of the party who called them 
and of other tainting influences.270 
 
While necessarily paid by a retaining party, the expert is expected to 
“don a scientist’s hat,” and, in doing so, the opinions expressed will be 
considered by a court.271  However, if the expert loses objectivity, the 
courts “will be reluctant to give much weight to [his or] her opinion.”272  
While in the United States experts are normally intended to provide the 
trier of fact with scientific or expert information,273 courts can—but often 
do not—consider partisan pressures in the admissibility decision.274  
 
269. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. para. 35; Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 25 (Can.). 
270. David M. Paciocco, Unplugging Jukebox Testimony in an Adversarial System: 
Strategies for Changing the Tune on Partial Experts, 34 QUEEN’S L.J. 565, 570 (2009); see also 
Morgan v. Metropolitan Toronto, 2006 CarswellOnt 7866, para. 276 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. of 
Justice) (“Expert witnesses must be objective and independent.  They must present their 
evidence in the style of scientists, not cheerleaders.”); Mitchell & Mandhane, supra note 234, 
at 643–44 (describing that even though Canadian courts deal with the problem differently, all 
“Canadian courts and tribunals have indicated a greater willingness to scrutinize the role 
played by expert witnesses”).  But see Mitchell & Mandhane, supra, at 644 (noting that 
Canadian courts lack a uniform method to handle or sanction expert witness bias); Paciocco, 
supra, at 586 (finding that “the existence of [special expert] duties remains controversial”). 
271. Morgan, 2006 CarswellOnt 7866, paras. 277–278 (internal citations omitted). 
272. Id. para. 279 (citations omitted).  Paciocco states that “[o]rdinarily, courts simply 
take bias, partiality and influence into account when weighing the testimony.”  Paciocco, 
supra note 270, at 571.  He then calls for exclusion of patently biased evidence, using a 
formalized rule-based system for compliance.  Id. at 585–89, 595–99; see also Mitchell & 
Mandhane, supra note 234, at 644 (“Where an expert is partial or lacks independence, his or 
her evidence may be given less weight or deemed inadmissible despite satisfaction of the four 
Mohan criteria.”). 
273. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
274. Generally, the Daubert factors do not directly connect concerns regarding witness 
partisanship to the admission decision for the proposed expert evidence.  See text 
accompanying notes 19–27.  It is precisely the lack of inquiry into partisanship that led Judge 
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Rather, the partisanship of the evidence remains largely independent of 
its reliability under the Daubert test, a subject likely to result in cross-
examination after admission but unlikely in and of itself to result in 
exclusion. 
A second Canadian procedure utilized to assist gatekeepers and 
factfinders assess expert evidence (which is also not used in U.S. courts) 
relates to the summation of the evidence by the judge at the end of the 
trial.  In the context of jury trials—in Canada, mostly criminal cases275—
the court summarizes the evidence for the jury prior to the 
deliberations.276  The summation will involve judicial clarification of the 
contested issues and facts, but not repeat the entire state of all evidence. 
The judge need not provide the jury with an oral replay of the 
evidence of each witness, but must relate the most important evidence 
to the key factual and legal issues.  The object is to leave the jury with a 
sufficient understanding of the value and effect of the most significant 
evidence as it relates to the relevant issues.277 
The obligation to summarize the evidence prior to the deliberation is 
binding on the judge, and may result in trial error if improperly done.278  
The summation can include lengthy assessment of key evidence from 
experts, as evinced by the detailed summations of psychiatric testimony 
in a case involving a defense of mental disorder.279  Ultimately, in the 
summary, the court must “review the substantial parts of the evidence, 
and give the jury the theory of the defence, so that they may appreciate 
the value and effect of that evidence, and how the law is to be applied to 
the facts as they find them.”280  The judge should define for the jury 
those issues critical to the case and separate out those that may be 
 
Kozinski to add an additional factor to the Supreme Court’s reliability factors in Daubert II: 
whether the research was done independently of the litigation in question.  Daubert II, 43 
F.3d 1311, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1995). 
275. See supra notes 247–249 and accompanying text. 
276. Vidmar, supra note 247, at 165; see also Michael Hall, Judicial Comment and the 
Jury’s Role in the Criminal Trial, 11 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 247, 267–68 (2007) (quoting Azoulay 
v. R., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 495, 498 (Can.)). 
277. R. v. Smith, 2007 CarswellAlta 938, para. 77 (Can. Alta. C.A.)(WL) (Frazer, C.J. & 
Fruman, J., concurring) (citing R. v. Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 314, para. 14 (Can.); and 
Azoulay, [1952] 2 S.C.R. at 497–98). 
278. R. v. Karaibrahimovic, 2002 CarswellAlta 550, paras. 32, 34, 37, 47 (Can. Alta. 
C.A.)(WL). 
279. See, e.g., Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 314, para. 15 (including a judicial summary 
fifteen pages long, which summarized the evidence of the mental disorder claimed by the 
accused). 
280. Azoulay, [1952] 2 S.C.R. at 498. 
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uncontested or tangential.  The jury will deliberate only after the judge’s 
summation. 
Beyond the summation of evidence, which is intended to objectively 
assess the issues and evidence in the case, Canadian courts have a third 
procedure to assist in assessing the expert evidence: the court’s 
comment on the evidence.  Judicial comment goes a step beyond the 
mere summation, which remains free of expressions of opinions on the 
evidence; it involves the express statement of the judicial belief about 
the evidence.281  The judge can express an opinion to the jury regarding 
the “importance of various pieces of evidence and may even offer an 
opinion regarding the credibility of a witness.”282  The limit on judicial 
comment is unclear, although courts have held that the commenting 
judge must inform the jury that comment is “given as advice and not 
direction,”283 so that the jury is less likely to be “overawed” by the 
judge’s views.284  This judicial comment is a separate judicial power 
related to, but distinct from, the judicial summation.285 
Like American courts, Canadian courts screen evidence prior to 
admission to preserve minimal standards of reliability.  However, the 
Canadian system does offer some differences that contrast with the 
American system with Daubert, and provides a useful starting point for 
the study of comparative expert methodology in foreign legal systems. 
B.  United Kingdom 
The handling of expert witnesses in the United Kingdom is 
substantially different from the U.S. system.  Many of the distinctions 
are based on procedural differences between tort systems, but the 
Canadian example demonstrates that differences in tort procedure need 
not result in completely different systems for expert management.  In 
the U.K. example, however, the bulk of expert review is not at the 
gatekeeping stage at all, but occurs instead at the merits stage.  Review 
 
281. Hall, supra note 276, at 249–50. 
282. Vidmar, supra note 247, at 165.  In contrast, such comments are specifically 
prohibited under American judicial standards.  See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3, R. 3.3 (2011), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html; CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(A)(6) (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedStatesJudges.aspx. 
283. R. v. Gunning, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 627, para. 27 (Can.); see also Hall, supra note 276, at 
249–53. 
284. R. v. Garofoli, 1988 CarswellOnt 68, para. 111 (Can. Ont. C.A.)(WL). 
285. See supra text accompanying note 278. 
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of management of experts in the United Kingdom again reveals a legal 
system struggling with the proper balance of reliability, assistance to the 
factfinder, and legal process. 
1. Basics of Case Management in the United Kingdom 
Evaluation of the role of the expert witness in the U.K. cannot begin 
without a preliminary assessment of the management of tort cases 
within the system.286  While U.K. tort law includes considerations of duty 
and breach by negligence—as in the United States and Canada—the 
differing procedural management of these cases has a large effect on the 
level of judicial management of expert witnesses.287 
In the United Kingdom, jury trials are much less common than in the 
United States.  In England, juries are required for certain enumerated 
criminal offenses,288 but a civil jury is limited to only certain claims, such 
as slander and libel, fraud, malicious prosecution, and false 
imprisonment.289  Dr. Richard Goldberg notes that personal injury 
actions in tort are generally decided by bench trials, and that the last 
reported jury trial for personal injuries occurred in 1965.290  In modern 
litigation, a civil jury trial in England for a personal injury claim remains 
possible, but for only “exceptional” cases.291  Even within the few areas 
 
286. This review will continue for all remaining examples, infra Parts IV.D–.E. 
287. See Richard Goldberg, Scientific Evidence, Causation and the Law—Lessons of 
Bendectin (Debendox) Litigation, 4 MED. L. REV. 32, 42 (1996) (describing the connection of 
the jury rules to the issue of evidentiary standards).  Regarding tort law in the U.K. generally, 
see TONY WEIR, TORT LAW (2002) (providing an overview of substantive tort law in the 
U.K.). 
288. Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries 
and Jury Reform in England and Wales, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1999, at 7, 15 
(explaining how offenses are classified into indictable offenses tried only to a jury, summary 
offenses with bench trials, and those “triable either way”).  Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas state 
that only 1%–2% of criminal cases are tried to a jury, and only 18% of cases before the 
Crown Court are “indictable only” and triable only in that court.  Id. at 15–16; see also GARY 
SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 127–49, 482 (6th ed. 2003) (noting 
similar numbers and describing offenses tried to the judge in Magistrate courts, indictable 
offenses tried to a jury in Crown Court, and those that may be tried either way). 
289. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 41 (citing Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 69 (Eng.)); 
see also SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 288, at 478. 
290. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 41 (citing Hodges v. Harland & Wolff, Ltd., [1965] 1 
W.L.R. 523 (C.A.)). 
291. Id. at 41 (citing Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273 (C.A.)) (only exceptional 
circumstances allow jury trial).  Exceptional circumstances include punitive or exemplary 
damages claimed in response to a deliberate abuse of authority, per Goldberg, supra note 287, 
at 41 (citing H. v. Ministry of Def., [1991] 2 Q.B. 103, 112 (C.A.)); see also SLAPPER & 
KELLY, supra note 288, at 481 (discussing jury trials in exemplary damages cases); Nancy S. 
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where a civil jury trial is permitted, a claim involving complex evidence 
(such as difficult scientific evidence on causation) would also be 
considered to be inappropriate for jury trial.292  As a result, civil jury 
trials for complex personal injuries torts are technically possible, but 
extraordinarily rare. 
Scottish law is more permissive than English law regarding jury trials 
in personal injury actions,293 as Dr. Goldberg notes, based on differences 
in Scottish statutory law that allows juries in these actions.294  But, he 
notes, a jury is “invariably used in personal injury actions where no 
special difficulties of law or fact are involved . . . [and i]t would seem, 
therefore, that cases involving questions of causation and medicinal 
products would rarely come before a jury in the English courts, and 
would only do so in the Scottish courts at the damages stage.”295  
Complexity of evidence may not be permitted as the sole basis for 
removal of a case from a jury, but can be one consideration in removal 
decisions.296  As a result, complex tort cases in Scotland are also unlikely 
to be decided except by bench trial. 
Independent of the statutory framework, practical considerations 
may also limit a litigant’s access to a jury trial.  In the U.K., contingency 
fee contracts for attorneys were, until recently, forbidden and 
“unthinkable.”297  In addition, both attorneys’ and other fees shift based 
 
Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
1041, 1101 n.257 (1995) (discussing the paucity of civil jury trials in England). 
292. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 41 (citing Singh v. London Underground, Ltd., (1990) 
Independent, 25 April (Q.B.)).  See generally Taylor v. Anderson, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 447 (C.A.) 
(discussing complexity exception to jury trial); Beta Constr., Ltd., v. Channel Four Television 
Co., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1042 (C.A.) (same). 
293. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 42. 
294. Id. (citing Court of Session Act, 1988, c. 36, § 11 (Scot.)). 
295. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
296. Id. at 42 n.67 (citing DAVID MAXWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF 
SESSION 299 (1980)). 
297. Richard L. Abel, An American Hamburger Stand in St.  Paul’s Cathedral: Replacing 
Legal Aid with Conditional Fees in English Personal Injury Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 
253, 253 (2001) (discussing new rules for fees in the U.K. since 1995).  See generally Peter 
Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee 
Contacts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998) (providing an analysis of the 
basis for the use and nonuse of contingency fees).  Regarding the modern “conditional fee” 
system, see Virginia G. Maurer et al., Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. and Western 
European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 272, 307–16 (1999); see also ROBIN M. 
WHITE & IAN D. WILLOCK, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM 344 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the 
contingency fee ban in Scotland). 
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on a “loser pays” system.298  Even in the event of a successful verdict, 
damage awards seldom include punitive damages, reducing the 
availability of larger recovery to litigants.299  The combined effect of 
these considerations is further reduction in the potential for jury trials.300 
Without the civil jury to consider the merits of a claim, the bench 
trial necessarily will involve the judicial assessment of the merits of the 
litigants’ evidence at the final adjudication phase of the trial.  The 
combined effect of these rules lessens the need for judicial gatekeeping 
at the admissibility stage.301  The admission stage generally does not 
then, in the United Kingdom, involve consideration of the reliability of 
the evidence, as it has in the United States under Daubert or in Canada 
under Mohan and R. v. J.-L.J.302 
2. Basic Expert Procedure Within the United Kingdom 
Since civil jury trials are extraordinarily rare, the admissibility stage 
has generally not been used as a time for the judge to assess expert 
testimony.303  So the standard for admission of expert evidence for jury 
trials, such as it is, is almost entirely discussed in the context of criminal 
 
298. CIV. PROC. R. 44.3(2)(a) (Eng.) (“[T]he general rule is that the unsuccessful party 
will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party . . . .”); LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, 
REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 467–68 (2009), available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/642936FA-292D-4432-8CF2-B2A44C7FC4FB/0/ja 
cksonvol2low.pdf (concluding that the loser pays as a general rule in England).  See generally 
David A Root, Note, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and 
Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 
589–91, 601–10 (2005) (reviewing history and effect of the English fee-shifting rule).  
Regarding Scottish fee shifting, see LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, supra, app. 9, at 550 (citing 
Howie v. Alexander & Sons, (1948) S.C. 154, 157 (Scot.)) (noting that costs generally follow 
the suit); see also McGregor v. Alpha Airports Grp. PLC, (2010) CSOH 51 [30] (Scot.) 
(noting that costs follow suit, and citing Howitt, (1948) S.C. at 157). 
299. See Andrew Tettenborn, Punitive Damages—A View from England, 41 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1551, 1551–56, 1551 n.1 (2004) (noting that English punitive damages were extremely 
limited from 1963–2001 and that Scottish law disallows punitive damages awards (citing 
2 DAVID M. WALKER, PRINCIPLES OF SCOTTISH PRIVATE LAW 160 (3d ed. 1983))). 
300. See ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS 57 n.1 (2007) 
(suggesting that these factors reduce the chance of toxic tort cases being brought). 
301. See REDMAYNE, supra note 218, at 98 (qualifications as sole issue for pre-admission 
reliability testing; argues for reliability-based exclusionary rule for expert evidence) (citations 
omitted); Goldberg, supra note 287, at 52. 
302. Regarding reliability assessment under Daubert, see text accompanying notes 25–
27.  Regarding reliability assessment under Mohan or R. v. J.-L.J., see text accompanying 
notes 232–246. 
303. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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cases, where jury trials do continue.  But, in these cases the standard for 
admission remains extraordinarily low. 
The basic admissibility standard in English criminal law comes from 
the case of R. v. Turner.304  In Turner, the court held that the test for 
admission of expert witness testimony should hinge on whether the 
expert can “furnish the court with scientific information which is likely 
to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.”305  Since 
the evidence in Turner was largely within the ordinary human 
experience of the jury, the court deemed that the psychiatrist’s 
testimony should not have been offered.306 
Case law since Turner—decided in 1975—confirms that the 
admissibility standard of English criminal case law is mainly concerned 
with the expert’s helpfulness to an issue outside the range of the jury’s 
knowledge.  In the case of R. v. Robb307 in 1991, Lord Justice Bingham 
focused on the determination of qualifications of the expert, holding 
that the issue should involve “whether study and experience will give a 
witness’s opinion an authority which the opinion of one not so qualified 
will lack,” and whether the witness is skilled and has experience.308  As a 
result, the court admitted expert voice-identification evidence over a 
defense objection, without verification by acoustic analysis as requested 
by the defense.309  Lord Justice Kennedy used a similar approach in his 
opinion in a 2002 case, R. v. Dallagher,310 formulating the test for 
admission of expert evidence as “‘whether the issue [was] one on which 
the jury could be assisted by expert evidence, and whether the expert 
tendered had the expertise to provide such evidence.’”311  Some U.K. 
case law—notably R v. Gilfoyle and R. v. O’Doherty—indicates some 
interest in assessing reliability of the expert evidence prior to admission; 
in Gilfoyle the court drew an analogy to Frye and Daubert.312  However, 
 
304. [1975] Q.B. 834 (C.A.). 
305. Id. at 841. 
306. Id. at 842. 
307. [1991] 93 Crim. App. R. 161, at 165 (Eng.). 
308. Id. at 165. 
309. Id. at 165–67. 
310. [2002] EWCA (Crim.) 1903, [2003] 1 Crim. App. R. 12 (Eng.). 
311. Id. para. 25 (quoting R. v. Stockwell, [1993] 97 Crim. App. R. 260, 264). 
312. R. v. O’Doherty, [2002] N.I. 263, [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 5, ¶60 (appeal from Northern 
Ireland) (rejecting expert evidence, but also rejecting Gilfoyle stringent standard); R v. 
Gilfoyle, [2001] 2 Cr. App. R. 5, ¶ 25 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 
1923)); see also William E. O’Brian Jr., Court Scrutiny of Expert Evidence: Recent Decisions 
Highlight the Tensions, 7 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 172, 172–73 (2003). 
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commentators on the state of expert review agree that the less stringent 
standard represents the current state of the law in the U.K.313 
In civil cases, English law permits the admission of expert evidence 
when it meets the statutory requirements of the Civil Evidence Act of 
1972.314  Pursuant to Section 3(1), an expert in a civil case may state an 
“opinion on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert 
evidence.”315  As will be discussed below, most commentators consider 
the standard created by this statutory formula to be minimal, and not 
inconsistent with the lax standard for the criminal cases discussed above. 
Legal scholars assessing the standard for review of expert admission 
agree that the reliability review of expert testimony in England—
whether in civil or criminal cases—is minimal.  In his article Court 
Scrutiny of Expert Evidence, William O’Brian notes that the “English 
cases appear to require nothing more than that the expert testimony in 
question [be] relevant and that the witness [be] more knowledgeable 
than the jury on the subject.”316  Such minimal standards provide no 
reliability standard, and as such, “put further strain on the potential for 
miscarriages of justice.”317  David Ormerod agrees that these standards 
allow evidence without significant reliability assessment.318  Without any 
tests to assess the reliability of the evidence, Ormerod notes that English 
law will admit questionable expert evidence “despite its inherent 
defects,”319 and that “there is little to prevent a court [from] receiving 
this evidence as expert opinion evidence.”320  With admission of 
questionable expert evidence, Ormerod decided these standards result 
in few checks to protect “the integrity and accuracy of the trial 
process.”321 
Since admissibility review involves such minimal assessment of an 
expert’s qualifications and the relevance of his or her testimony, nearly 
all of the reliability assessment of expert evidence in tort cases from the 
 
313. See text accompanying notes 315–321. 
314. Civil Evidence Act, 1972, c. 30 (Eng.). 
315. Id. § 3(1). 
316. O’Brian, supra note 312, at 180. 
317. Id. at 184. 
318. David Ormerod, Psychological Autopsies: Legal Implications and Admissibility, 5 
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 1, 18–21 (2001). 
319. Id. at 20. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 30. 
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U.K. occurs at the adjudication stage.322  Examples of English judicial 
decisions demonstrate extraordinarily detailed review of highly complex 
scientific evidence in determining whether a claimant has proven a 
claim.323  In one case, XYZ v. Schering Health Care, Mr. Justice Mackay 
noted that, as adjudicator of the dispute, he must determine which 
evidence was reliable and which was not; he then reviewed forty-two 
days of testimony involving complex epidemiological studies for 
scientific merit.324  Scottish case law also shows similar assessments of 
complex science, with judges reviewing the evidence in detail at the 
adjudication phase.325  For example, in Dingley v. Chief Constable of 
Strathclyde, Lord Dawson assessed epidemiological studies in the 
assessment of injury causation, and held that the relationship of trauma 
to multiple sclerosis had not been proven by the plaintiff.326  Dawson’s 
skill in evidence review in Dingley has been described as a “master class 
in legal exposition of very complex matters.”327 
Yet for all the skill demonstrated by the Justices in Scherling or 
Dingley, the issue of reliability tests remains one in dispute within the 
U.K. 
3. Potential for Change to System 
Considering the current standard for admissibility in case law, some 
commentators suggest that a reliability standard should be adopted in 
the U.K.  In this regard, some suggest adoption of the American 
Daubert standard—even with its potential weaknesses—due to its 
potential to sort out reliable evidence. 
The problem with low admission standards is that, once deemed a 
qualified expert, nearly any evidence from the expert gets admitted and 
considered by the court.  As a result, the potential for “junk science” to 
invade the courthouse remains a persistent problem, which 
 
322. Goldberg, supra note 287, at 52; see also supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
323. See, e.g., XYZ v. Schering Health Care Ltd., [2002] EWHC 1420 (Q.B.); Reay v. 
British Nuclear Fuels, [1994] P.I.Q.R. P171 (Q.B.). 
324. Schering Health Care, [2002] EWHC, ¶ 34; see also Reay, [1994] P.I.Q.R. 
para. 178–207 (detailed assessment of epidemiological evidence in personal injury case 
involving radiation exposure). 
325. Smith v. McNair, [2008] CSOH 154 (Scot.); McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 
[2005] CSOH 69 (Scot.); Dingley v. Chief Constable of Strathclyde (No. 1), (1998) S.C. 548 
(Scot.). 
326. Dingley, (1998) S.C. at 585. 
327. Smith, [2008] CSOH 154, para. 24 (reviewing handling of complex evidence in 
Dingley). 
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commentators like O’Brian suggest will lead to “miscarriages of 
justice.”328  To remedy this problem, O’Brian and others call for 
reliability assessment similar to a U.S.-style reliability test.329 
One approach, suggested by Tony Ward in English Law’s 
Epistemology of Expert Testimony is to create a reliability test based on 
another nation’s standard.330  He suggests the Australian test from R. v. 
Bonython as the appropriate standard, and notes it has gained some 
support in English decisions.331  Ward suggests this test may offer 
reliability standards, while preserving the relative roles of the judge and 
jury.332  In Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice, Mike Redmayne looks 
to Frye and Daubert as a model for U.K. reliability assessments.333  At 
this point, however, it appears that no particular reliability standard 
exists, and evidence gatekeeping is virtually nonexistent in the U.K. 
One additional procedure that has recently been added to English 
trial procedure involves the use of single experts, when the court deems 
it appropriate.  In certain cases, the court may request that a single 
expert address an issue rather than each party address it separately.334  
The selection of the expert may be done by the parties or, if they cannot 
agree, by the judge based on a list provided by the parties.335  While the 
procedure may allow for single experts, the current use is mainly in 
“routine cases where the claims involved are modest.”336  As for now, the 
procedure is less likely to be applied in complex cases,337 but with the 
rule there is the potential for a nonadversarial expert procedure in 
complex cases in English courts. 
With the creation of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in 
 
328. O’Brian, supra note 312, at 184. 
329. Id. at 181 (citing REDMAYNE, supra note 218, at 94–139); see also REDMAYNE, 
supra note 218, at 98 & n.34 (“In this chapter I argue that English law should create a 
reliability-based exclusionary rule for expert evidence.”). 
330. Tony Ward, English Law’s Epistemology of Expert Testimony, 33 J.L. & SOC’Y 572 
(2006). 
331. Id. at 579–80 (quoting and discussing R. v. Bonython, (1984) 38 S.A. St. R. 45, 47, 
which held that the court should assess if an opinion is “part of a body of knowledge or 
experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable body of 
knowledge or experience”). 
332. Ward, supra note 330, at 595. 
333. REDMAYNE, supra note 218, at 113–38; see also O’Brian, supra note 312, at 184. 
334. CIV. PROC. R. 35.7 (Eng.). 
335. Id. R. 35.7(2). 
336. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 109: EXPERT WITNESS 49–
50 (2005) (commenting on the English use of joint experts). 
337. Id. 
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2009, at least there is the potential for adoption of a single new standard 
within the U.K., by common law development through precedent.338  
The Supreme Court—as the final court of appeal for all civil cases in the 
U.K.—has jurisdiction to hear the appeals on those cases of “the 
greatest public and constitutional importance.”339  It remains to be seen 
if the new Supreme Court will take on the issue of expert testimony and 
reliability standards. 
The United Kingdom offers a contrast to the U.S. and Canadian 
examples of evidentiary screening, both of which have some assessment 
of reliability prior to admission of the evidence.  While some case law 
from the U.K. shows judicial skill in handling expert evidence at the 
merits phase, the effect of minimal gatekeeping is an expertise free-for-
all, where all evidence gets admitted for consideration.  The resulting 
standards of admission mirror a debate on “junk science” that occurred 
in the United States in the years leading to Daubert.340 
Having reviewed two common law systems, it appears that Canadian 
judges may perform gatekeeping when unnecessary (in civil cases tried 
to a judge),341 while English judges may not screen expert evidence when 
it does seem helpful and appropriate (in criminal cases tried to a jury).342 
C.  Civil Law Procedures Offer Appropriate Points of Comparison 
In this Article’s review of expert procedures, other common-law 
nations could be the sole examples used.  And it is common for 
 
338. Constitution Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov. 
uk/ukpga/2005/4/pdfs/ukpga_20050004_en.pdf (describing the Act creating Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom).  See generally The Supreme Court, JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
PRIVY COUNCIL, http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/the-supreme-court.html (last visited 
June 5, 2012). 
339. Role of the Supreme Court, JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/role-of-the-supreme-court.html (last visited June 5, 
2012). 
340. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science,” 1998 STAN. TECH L. 
REV. 3, ¶¶ 4–8 (1998), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/edmund-mercer-trashing-junk-science.pdf 
(reviewing history of the junk science debate and discussing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S 
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991)); see also CRANOR, supra note 113, at 
46–47 (describing the perception of tort crisis in years prior to Daubert).  In Daubert itself, the 
Court specifically addressed the concern that abandonment of the Frye standard would result 
in a “free-for-all” of junk science overwhelming judges and juries, deciding that conventional 
legal tools like summary judgment, cross-examination, and careful instruction negate the 
concern.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96 (1993). 
341. See Chan v. Erin Mills Town Ctr., 2005 CarswellOnt 6741, paras. 30–33; text 
accompanying notes 252–57. 
342. See R. v. Robb, [1991] 93 Crim. App. R. 161; text accompanying notes 304–306. 
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practitioners in common law systems to be unfamiliar with civil law 
systems beyond the basics: it is foreign, code based, and non-
adversarial.343  These common limitations may result from attorneys in 
American and other common law systems often learning solely points of 
contrast between civil and common law, if they are exposed to civil law 
at all.344  Even with many differences between common and civil law 
methods, they are not completely incompatible systems of law.345 
Borrowing from other legal systems has softened traditional 
differences to some extent.346  Procedures that initially fit within civil law 
may have a place in common law systems, and vice versa.347  If true, civil 
law systems may offer some alternative procedures that could help fix 
problems in expert witness rules in the United States.348  The handling of 
expert witnesses seems likely to be an area particularly well suited to 
transnational adoptions,349 as recognized by commentators such as 
Langbein.350 
D.  Germany 
Before discussing specific reforms based on civil law procedures, this 
Article will examine the role of the expert witness in civil law systems in 
Germany and Japan.  To start, review of expert witness procedures in 
Germany provides an example of a system struggling with proper 
balancing of reliability, assistance to the factfinder, and legal process. 
 
343. JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A PRIMER ON THE 
CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1 (1995). 
344. Id.; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 
46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4–11 (2001) (providing examples of areas of comparative difference 
taught in United States). 
345. Regarding the basic differences between systems, see APPLE & DEYLING, supra 
note 344, at 35–38; and Peter Alldridge, Scientific Expertise and Comparative Criminal 
Procedure, 3 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 141, 143 (1999) (dismissing the categorization of the 
two systems). 
346. APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 343, at 39 (suggesting that “the distinctions between 
the two systems have blurred” as one system adopts characteristics from the other). 
347. See Alldridge, supra note 345, at 150–51 (noting two methodologies for reform of 
common law legal systems originating from the civil law tradition, which are repeatedly 
suggested by commentators). 
348. Regarding the deficiencies in the handling of experts under Daubert, see supra 
Parts II.B–.E.  Regarding civil law as a source of law reform, see supra text accompanying 
notes 9, 175–176. 
349. Supra text accompanying notes 204–220. 
350. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure, supra note 10, at 552; see also 
Bryan, supra note 9, at 526; Haack, supra note 17, at 23. 
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1. Basics of Judicial Structure and Tort Case Management in Germany 
Because of significant differences from the U.S. system, it is 
necessary to provide a brief description of the management of tort cases 
in Germany, to place the expert role in context.351  To do so, this Article 
will examine the basic structure of the judicial system in Germany, the 
basis of tort liability under the German Civil Code, and then the 
management of tort cases. 
The judicial system in Germany is bifurcated between the courts of 
general jurisdiction and courts handling specialized issues.352  Within 
individual German states, courts of general jurisdiction include two 
basic courts, the Amtsgerichte, or lower-level courts, and the 
Landgerichte, the first instance courts for larger claims.353  Most appeals 
of the lower-level Amtsgerichte decisions occur at the Landgerichte, 
while a higher-level appellate court—the Oberlandesgericht—hears 
appeals from the Landgerichte.354  The highest appellate court is the 
Bundesgerichtshof, which may hear appeals from the Oberlandesgericht 
or, rarely, directly from the Landgerichte.355  Certain claims, such as 
trademarks, labor and employment, or tax, have specialized courts and 
appellate structures independent of the general-issue court system.356  
For complex tort litigation,357 the main courts involved would be the 
Landgerichte in the first instance, with appeals at the 
Oberlandesgericht. 
General tort liability within the German legal system is based on 
 
351. The specific issue of the expert witness within this system is handled separately.  See 
infra Part IV.D.2. 
352. See generally GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 92–96; NIGEL G. FOSTER & 
SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 66–79 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the general 
structure of the German court system); Edward M. Andries, On the German Constitution’s 
Fiftieth Anniversary: Jacques Maritain and the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 13 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 1, 44 n.167 (1999). 
353.  FOSTER & SULE, supra note 352, at 69–71; ANKE FRECKMANN & THOMAS 
WEGERICH, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM 138–40 (1999).  The statute currently sets the 
dividing line between jurisdiction in the Amtsgerichte and the Landgerichte at 5,000.  See 
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG] [Court organizational statute], Sept. 12, 1950, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I], at 455, as amended, July 12, 2011, BGBl. I. at 2582, § 23 
¶ 1, 74; FOSTER & SULE, supra, note 352, at 69–70. 
354. FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 353, at 140. 
355. Id. 
356. Allen et al., A Plea, supra note 178, at 713–14; Langbein, The German Advantage, 
supra note 57, at 851–52. 
357. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
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several code provisions of the German Civil Code—the Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch (BGB).358  Written in the late 19th century with an effective 
date of 1900, the code establishes a series of duties, violation of which 
may result in civil liability.359  The BGB provision on general duties 
holds that “[a] person who intentionally or negligently injures the life, 
body, health, freedom, property or other right of another unlawfully is 
obliged to compensate the other for the harm arising from this.”360  In 
addition, liability may attach to one who offends a specific civil code 
provision established for another’s protection, so long as there is fault.361  
Intentional acts also may result in liability under a separate code 
provision.362  In addition to the general provisions, the code contains 
many subject-specific provisions establishing duty.363 
Should a person violate a duty and be found liable, he must pay 
damages to “restore the position that would exist if the circumstance 
obliging him to pay damages had not occurred.”364  The loser in litigation 
also pays the costs of the litigation, including court costs and attorney’s 
fees.365  With regard to complex torts—which often involve 
pharmaceutical or products liability claims—the German system does 
not contain provisions equivalent to a general “class action” lawsuit, as 
 
358. BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A 
COMPARATIVE TREATISE 24–26 (4th ed. 2002); CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 61 
(2006). 
359. Harald Koch, The Law of Torts, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 205, 207–21 
(Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2d ed. 2005); MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra 
note 358, at 24–26 (suggesting that BGB civil code provisions may establish tort liability). 
360. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt 
[RGBl.] 195, as amended, § 823 para. 1), translated in RAYMOND YOUNGS, SOURCEBOOK ON 
GERMAN LAW 435 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter BGB]. 
361. Id. § 823, para 2. 
362. Id. § 826; see also VAN DAM, supra note 358, at 70 (discussing BGB § 826). 
363. See, e.g., VAN DAM, supra note 358, at 67 (discussing BGB § 824 (financial 
trustworthiness), BGB § 825 (infringement on sexual integrity), and BGB § 839 (breach of 
official duty)). 
364. BGB § 249; see also Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No “Efficient Breach” in the Civil 
Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 721, 744 (2007) (discussing damages provisions in Germany). 
365. Astrid Stadler & Wolfgang Hau, The Law of Civil Procedure, in INTRODUCTION 
TO GERMAN LAW, supra note 359, at 365, 377 (citing Zivilprozeβordnung [ZPO] [German 
Code of Civil Procedure], Jan. 30, 1877, RGBl. at 83, § 91, translated in GERMAN 
COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IN ENGLISH (Charles E. Stewart trans., 
2001) [hereinafter ZPO]); FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 353, at 170.  The payment 
can be divided with a partial verdict for both parties.  FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra, at 
170 (citing ZPO § 92). 
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in American law.366  Without mass tort methodologies, each claimant 
must prove his or her damages independently, and risk having to pay 
costs.367 
In addition to court structures and claim bases, the third necessary 
area to review is the procedural management of tort claims in German 
courts, particularly the Landgerichte.  A legal claim begins in Germany, 
as in the United States, with the filing of a complaint that includes a 
theory of recovery and a request for relief.368  From this similar starting 
point, however, the case management structure diverges from typical 
U.S. procedures, in that the judge alone becomes the manager of the 
case and factfinder.369  Initially, the Plaintiff’s complaint—and the 
Defendant’s response—must allege not only the basic theory of liability, 
but also the “means of proof for its main factual contentions.”370  Only 
after the exchange of initial documents, and an initial determination that 
the claim could—if all the facts are proven as alleged—result in liability, 
will the judge begin the process of collecting, and then evaluating, the 
evidence.371  The judge’s role is to do “justice between the parties; it is 
not to ascertain some independent truth,” but the court is also to 
determine what is true based on evidence suggested by the parties for 
judicial review.372 
When the judge is collecting evidence in the case, there is not a clear 
distinction between “trial” and “discovery.”  All collection of evidence 
 
366. William B. Fisch, European Analogues to the Class Action: Group Action in France 
and Germany, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 51, 75–78 (1979); Mullenix, supra note 344, at 7 (noting that 
there is no German-law provision for representing class interests (citing Harald Koch, Class 
and Public Interest Actions in German Law, 5 CIV. JUST. Q. 66, 77 (1986))); Gerhard Walter, 
Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 369, 372–73 
(2001). 
367. One exception to this rule is that individual cases may be joined if they involve the 
same or essentially similar factual or legal grounds, but each party remains an active 
participant.  Fisch, supra note 366, at 75.  Another exception occurs when private claimants 
associate with a criminal prosecution for payment of claims.  Id. at 71–74 (noting Thalidomide 
litigation example). 
368. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 827. 
369. Compare this to the rate of bench trials in torts in U.S. District Court, infra text 
accompanying note 487—currently fewer than 30%. 
370. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 827 (citing ZPO § 130, 
para. 5); see also Burkhard Bastuck & Burkard Göpfert, Admission and Presentation of 
Evidence in Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 609, 610–11 (1994). 
371. FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 353, at 146. 
372. Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 11 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 61, 66–67 (2003) (rejecting idealization of the German system as inquisitorial, 
without adversarial influences). 
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in Germany, including examination of witnesses, is part of the process 
leading to judgment.373  One additional contrast to the American system 
involves the German judicial role, which is more active than the 
American judicial role in the selection of which order to address issues 
in the case, the examination of the witnesses, and the selection of an 
expert witness, if needed, after consulting with the parties.374 
Witness examination involves the judge asking questions, and then 
allowing an opportunity for the parties to follow-up with additional 
examination, without the cross-examination that is universal in U.S. 
courts.375  Witness testimony is not recorded or transcribed, but “rather, 
the judge pauses from time to time to dictate a summary of the 
testimony” for the court file.376  Through a series of hearings as needed, 
the judge will collect summaries of witness testimony and other evidence 
for the court’s file.377  The court file is the official case record to be used 
in issuing judgments and, if applicable, for any appeals.378  During or 
after the period of evidence collection, the court can issue a judgment if 
a claim is established or rejected, or for other case management 
purposes.379  German courts, therefore, can dismiss claims or cases on 
procedural grounds at any stage when the evidence shows a claim is 
unsubstantiated.380 
Within the constraints of the German legal system, expert witnesses 
operate to assist the court in the determination of the case. 
2. The Role and Function of Experts Within the German Legal System 
An expert witness in Germany fulfills the same function as in the 
United States—providing the decisionmaker with information of a 
 
373. See id. at 72 (crediting this structure to the absence of juries in German civil 
litigation, which eliminates the need for all evidence to be heard at once). 
374. Id. at 63–64. 
375. See Kötz, supra note 372, at 63; see also Langbein, The German Advantage, supra 
note 57, at 828. 
376. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 828. 
377. Id.; Kötz, supra note 372, at 64. 
378. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 828. 
379. FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 353, at 161–63. 
380. Id.; see also Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 
GEO. L.J. 1983, 2008 (1999) (“By taking testimony on particular issues, rather than taking the 
testimony for the entire case during a single trial, an inquisitorial court can focus initially on 
those issues most likely to be dispositive.”); Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, 
at 830 (finding that “in German procedure the court ranges over the entire case, constantly 
looking for the jugular—for the issue of law or fact that may dispose of the case”). 
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scientific or technical nature to assist in resolution of the claim.  Yet, 
because of varying case management procedures, an individual expert 
witness in Germany has more influence over the case resolution than his 
or her counterpart in the United States.  The role is not limitless, 
however, and the German courts have ways to balance the scientific 
expertise with necessary limits of legal process. 
After both parties make claims in the pleadings stage of the case, the 
judge must determine whether an expert will be necessary to decide a 
contested issue.381  If so, the judge will appoint an expert to assist him or 
her in the determination of the contested issue.382  To determine who to 
select, the judge may request the parties to nominate an expert, but 
more often will select the expert himself or herself.383  Once selected, the 
expert’s role is to assist the court to resolve the issues on which technical 
or scientific information is required.384 
After choosing an expert, the court “propound[s] the facts that [the 
expert] is to assume or to investigate, and . . . fram[es] the questions that 
the court wishes the expert to address.”385  Once instructed, the expert 
should examine all issues necessary to render an opinion, within the 
scope of his or her expertise and the court’s direction.386  An expert has a 
duty to assess the case neutrally, with a commitment to finding the 
truth.387  After review, the expert often prepares a written report for the 
court, explaining his or her opinion on the issues presented.388  Once the 
 
381. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 837. 
382. Id. 
383. Id.; see also Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 173–74; Bastuck & Göpfert, supra note 
370, at 616. 
384. Kötz, supra note 372, at 64 (demonstrating that an expert serves to “assist the court 
to the best of [the expert’s] ability in reaching a correct result”); Stadler & Hau, supra note 
367, at 374 (stating that the expert’s task is “to help the judge to ascertain facts . . . based on 
their expert knowledge”); see also Wolfgang Zeidler, Court Practice and Procedure Under 
Strain: A Comparison, 8 ADEL. L. REV. 150, 156 (1983) (concluding that German experts 
serve as neutral assistants to the court, to supply the court with technical knowledge not 
otherwise available to the court). 
385. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 839; see also ZPO, Jan. 30, 
1877, RGBL. at 83, § 403 (“The evidence shall be presented by designation of the points 
requiring expert opinion.”); ZPO § 404a, para. 3 (“In cases of disputed facts, the court shall 
determine the facts on which the expert is to base his or her report.”). 
386. ZPO § 404a, para. 4 (court directions limit expert ability to investigate facts). 
387. ZPO § 410, para. 1, sentence 2 (oath to perform duty to the expert’s best knowledge 
and conscience). 
388. Bastuck & Göpfert, supra note 370, at 616 (suggesting that “[m]ost expert opinions 
are submitted to the court in writing”); Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 
839 (“The expert is ordinarily instructed to prepare a written opinion.” (citing ZPO § 411, 
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report is filed, the court may call the expert to testify or to answer 
questions on his or her findings.389  After the court takes oral testimony, 
it enters the opinion and a summary of testimony into the court’s file, 
and then may rely on it in deciding the claim.390  In a vast majority of 
cases, the court follows the expert opinion of the court’s expert.391 
Within the scope of these rules, there are few methods that a litigant 
can use to challenge an expert’s conclusions.  Initially, a party can 
challenge the expert under the high standard of recusal for lack of 
neutrality.392  Once an expert issues a report, the court may call the 
witness to testify; while most of the questioning is done by the court, the 
parties may ask questions to clarify testimony.393  After the initial report 
and testimony, a party may—if asserting the initial expert is 
unconvincing—request the court appoint a new expert, although it is 
solely within the judge’s discretion to do so.394  Even if the court refuses 
to appoint a second expert, a party may offer a private expert to 
supplement the record and provide an additional opinion.395  A final 
method to challenge the expert’s opinions would be by appeal, as the 
 
para. 1, allowing written opinions)). 
389. Bastuck & Göpfert, supra note 370, at 616; Langbein, The German Advantage, 
supra note 57, at 839; see also ZPO § 411, para. 3 (“The court may order the appearance of 
the expert to explain his or her written opinion.”). 
390. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 175. 
391. Id. at 175–76 (suggesting that judges are unlikely to reject expert report as courts 
lack scientific knowledge in expert fields); see also id. at 176 n.83 (citing Horst Sendler, 
Richter und Sachverständige, NJW, Nov. 18, 1986, at 2907, 2909 (describing research finding 
that courts follow experts 95% of the time)). 
392. Id. at 174 (citing ZPO §§ 42–45 (describing recusal standards for judges) and ZPO 
§ 406 (concluding that the judicial recusal rule applies to experts)). 
393. Id. at 175 (citing ZPO § 411, para. 3, which states, “The court may order the 
appearance of the expert to explain his or her written opinion”); Kötz, supra note 372, at 64; 
Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 839.  Timmerbeil explains this is not 
American-style cross-examination, but “polite questioning in a non-confrontational 
atmosphere.”  Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 175. 
394. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 175 (discussing ZPO § 412, para. 1, which states 
“The court may order that the same or another expert render a new expert opinion in the 
event that it considers that the expert opinion is inadequate”); Langbein, The German 
Advantage, supra note 57, at 839.  Langbein notes this would be done in cases where the 
initial report is “sloppy or partial, [such] that it rests upon a view of the field that is not 
generally shared, or that the question referred to the expert is exceptionally difficult.”  
Langbein, The German Advantage, supra, at 840 (citing KURT JESSNITZER, DER 
GERICHTLICHE SACHVERSTÄNDIGE 231–32 (7th ed. 1978)). 
395. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 177–78 (noting that private experts do not have the 
“same value” as the court’s expert, as their conclusions are assertions of the party, not 
evidence); Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 840 (court discounts party 
expert for want of neutrality). 
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litigant challenges the judgment on a claim of legal or factual error.396 
With so few methods to challenge, the expert role has been criticized 
in Germany as being one of “de facto decision-maker” for the judge.397  
Necessarily without knowledge to decide the issue requiring technical 
expertise, the judge is ill-suited to challenge the report of an expert.398  
Because the judge is unable to challenge the expert in the field of 
expertise, the acceptance rate of expert opinion by the judges exceeds 
90%!399  The high level of influence the court’s expert has on cases 
makes the selection of an expert essential to preserving legitimacy of the 
process, by ensuring selection of an expert who the parties will accept as 
fair.400 
A German judge faced with the issue of selection of an expert in a 
complex tort follows certain procedures to ensure a qualified expert.  
Initially, the judge may consult with the parties on who is to be selected, 
and if the parties agree, the judge must appoint that expert.401  Barring 
agreement, the judge will need assistance to select someone who is 
skilled in a field differing from the judge’s own.  In Germany, the official 
regulatory agency overseeing licensed professionals maintains lists of 
persons “deemed especially suited to serve as experts.”402  For other 
fields, the state may delegate to the relevant trade or industry group the 
responsibility of maintaining the list of appropriate and qualified 
 
396. Regarding the procedure for appeals in Germany, see Stadler & Hau, supra note 
365, at 377–78; FOSTER & SULE, supra note 352, at 133–34 (citing ZPO § 538, allowing appeal 
for a defect in the underlying judgment); and Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 
57, at 855–57 (reviewing German appellate procedure).  Regarding appeals and experts, see 
Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 174 (appeal of final judgment allows appeal of expert issues). 
397. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 180 (citation omitted); see also Allen et al., A Plea, 
supra note 178, at 738 (concern that experts become “secret judges”); Neil Netanel 
Weinstock, Expert Opinion and Reform in Anglo-American, Continental, and Israeli 
Adjudication, 10 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 9, 40 (1986) (“Continental judges have 
been criticized frequently for using the expertise procedure as a means to delegate their 
judicial responsibilities.”). 
398. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 175–76, 180; Weinstock, supra note 397, at 42 
(noting that civil law judges lack technical training to challenge expert reports).  Other 
criticisms include the debate over the role of experts vis-à-vis the court, per Allen et al., A 
Plea, supra note 178, at 738, or the court using experts to reach results already decided upon 
by the judge, per Coester & Markesinis, supra note 211, at 306. 
399. See supra note 391 (and sources cited); Weinstock, supra note 397, at 42. 
400. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS 316–46, 477–85 (1995). 
401. Timmerbeil, supra note 218, at 174 (citing ZPO § 404, para. 4). 
402. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 837–38 (methodology of 
expert list creation). 
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experts.403  Both the professional list and the trade or industry list will be 
available to the judges when the need for an expert arises, allowing for a 
selection of a person well qualified and respected among his or her 
peers.404 
While the German expert system is not without criticism, it has stuck 
a balance between the need for scientific and technical expertise, the 
parties’ ability to challenge expertise, efficiency, and the legitimacy of 
litigation outcomes.  These decisions provide contrast to the American-
style adversarial expert system. 
E.  Japan 
If Germany provides a basic and long-standing example of a civil law 
system handling scientific expertise, then Japanese management of 
expert witnesses serves as an example of a civil law nation 
experimenting with reform.  Japan serves as an interesting counterpoint 
to Germany because, in addition to the reforms, German models have 
significantly influenced the Japanese judicial system.405 
1. Basics of Judicial Structure and Tort Case Management in Japan 
To examine the role of the expert witness in Japan in detail, this 
Article will first—as with Germany—examine the overall structure of 
the judicial system in Japan, the bases of tort liability under the Japanese 
Civil Code, and case management of torts within that system.  Only after 
reviewing those areas will the expert witness role, and the balancing of 
scientific and technical expertise with legal process, be examined in 
detail. 
Like the German system, the Japanese legal system has two levels of 
courts for civil claims, based on the amount in dispute.  Lower-level 
 
403. Id. (noting that the list is compiled of qualified experts, who also swear to render 
impartial assistance).  Regarding experts’ duty to render impartial advice, see supra text 
accompanying notes 271–274 (addressing same issue in Canada and the United States), and 
note 384 (finding that German experts are obligated to render impartial, objective opinions); 
see also Bastuck & Göpfert, supra note 370, at 616. 
404. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 57, at 837–38. 
405. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 50 (stating that Japanese prewar 
jurisprudence “was completely dominated by the German approach”); Takeshi Kojima, 
Japanese Civil Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 689 
(1998) (“Basic Japanese civil procedure is patterned mainly upon German civil procedure.”); 
Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 563–64 (2001) 
(describing Japanese civil procedure based on German codes).  Regarding the development 
of prewar Japanese law, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra, at 25–75. 
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claims with disputed claims under ¥1,400,000 are heard by a Summary 
Court.406  Summary Courts are intended to provide streamlined 
procedures for efficient adjudication of smaller disputes.407  For disputes 
involving larger sums, Japan uses District Courts.408  Analogous to 
German Landgerichte, Japanese District Courts serve as first instance 
venue for claims over ¥1,400,000 but also as an appellate court for cases 
heard at a Summary Court.409  A case appealed from the District Court 
will be heard at the High Court,410 with a final appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Japan.411  Also analogous to the German system, some claims—
family or domestic issues, patent disputes, trade, or labor—use 
specialized courts or administrative review processes independent of the 
courts of general jurisdiction.412  In the context of complex tort 
 
406. Saibansho Ho [Court Organization Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 33(1)(i) (Japan), 
available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=5&re=02&dn=1&gn=99 
&sy=1947&ht=A&no=&x=40&y=14&ky=&page=10.  The value of ¥1,400,000 is slightly over 
$17,000 U.S.; this is based on the current exchange rate of 82 Yen to 1 U.S. Dollar.  Exchange 
Rates: New York Closing Snapshot, WALL ST. J., available at http://online.wsj.com/mdc/ 
public/page/2_3021-forex.html (last visited June 5, 2012). 
407. MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 346–47 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the 
specific procedures that allow for efficient handling through the court system). 
408. Id. at 348. 
409. Saibansho Ho [Court Organization Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 24 (setting 
District Court jurisdiction); DEAN, supra note 407, at 348; GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 
218, at 240–41. 
410. DEAN, supra note 407, at 351; GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 237.  Note 
also that in rare instances, a case in Summary Court may “leapfrog” to the High Court 
without intermediate appeal to the District Court.  DEAN, supra, at 352; see also GOODMAN, 
JUSTICE, supra, at 237. 
411. DEAN, supra note 407, at 352.  Like a Summary Court appeal skipping the District 
Court and going to the High Court instead, a District Court case may—in rare instances—
skip the High Court level and be heard at the Supreme Court.  Id. at 352–53, 365. 
412. See generally CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 162–67 (2d rev. ed. 2008) [hereinafter GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW] (describing 
the Japanese legal system); Akira Mikazuki, Saibansho Seido (Judicial System), in THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 444, 453–58 (Hideo 
Tanaka ed., 1976) (same).  Regarding family court, see DEAN, supra note 407, at 349–51; 
YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 129–32 (Anthony H. Angelo ed., 
trans., 1976) (describing the different agencies of the district courts, as well as family and 
summary courts).  Regarding patent courts, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 238; 
Yoshinobu Someno & Keiko Someno, Patent Office and Court Procedures in Japan, in 
PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 110, 120–21 
(Teruo Doi & Warren L. Shattuck eds., 1977) (describing the adjudication of patent denials); 
Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan—A Procedure for the Coming 
Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767, 782 (1997) (describing special venue for patent litigation).  
Regarding trade disputes, see MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 98–116 (1993) (describing the Fair Trade Commission 
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litigation,413 the initial court involved would usually be the District 
Court, followed by appellate assessment at the High Court level. 
Japan’s legal system bases its general tort liability in its Civil Code, 
which was initially based on the German Civil Code.414  As with the 
German code, the Japanese Civil Code—the Minpō—contains a general 
provision on tort liability, declaring “A person who has intentionally or 
negligently infringed upon any right of others, or legally protected 
interest of others, shall be liable to compensate any damages resulting in 
consequence.”415  In addition to the general provision, the code also 
provides for subject-specific provisions establishing duty for specific 
situations.416 
If a claimant establishes a violation of the civil code provisions, then 
the defendant must pay damages.  Damages in Japan include monetary 
payment to compensate for losses resulting from the wrong, and may 
include compensation for pain and suffering,417 but not punitive 
damages.418  Just as with the German system, the Japanese Civil Code 
contains no general “class action” procedure similar to U.S. law,419 
meaning that each claimant must file suit to prove his or her damages.420 
 
procedures).  Regarding labor courts, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 244–45.  
More detailed review of specialized courts is beyond the scope of this Article. 
413. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
414. Eri Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in Japan, 26 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 394 (2009); Eric A. Feldman, Essay, Law, Society, and Medical 
Malpractice Litigation in Japan, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 257, 262 (2009).  See 
generally Ronald Frank, Law of Obligations, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868, at 
227, 234–36 (Wilhelm Rohl ed., 2005) (describing law of obligations in civil code; obligations 
are “a right to claim performance or omission of a definite act from a definite person” and 
civil code provides remedies for non-performance). 
415. MINPŌ [MINPO] [CIV. C.], art. 709, available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&printID=&re=02&ky=gratuito
usly&page=3&vm=02. 
416. See, e.g., id. arts. 715 (revealing the liability of employers), 717 (revealing the 
liability of landowner), 718 (revealing the liability of possessor of an animal), 723 
(defamation), available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&prin
tID=&re=02&ky=gratuitously&page=3&vm=02 (last visited December 20, 2010). 
417. Id. art. 722 para. 1; GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 371; Osaka, supra note 
414, at 395. 
418. Osaka, supra note 414, at 395–96.  This policy extends to prohibiting enforcement 
of foreign punitive damages awards.  Id. at 395 & n.12; see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra 
note 218, at 373 (noting that Japan does not permit punitive damages). 
419. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 414.  Goodman explains that there is a new 
“representative action” available under Japan’s 1996 code, but it contains limits on claims 
inconsistent with American class actions.  Id. at 414–15. 
420. Regarding other reasons why Japan has few tort claims when compared to the 
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Even without class actions amalgamating claims, the total amount of 
litigation in Japan is relatively small.  In 2008, the total number of 
pending civil claims in Japanese District Courts was nearly 110,000, after 
approximately 220,000 cases had been filed and a similar number had 
been resolved.421  Unlike many other nations, Japan has adopted the 
American Rule, where parties each pay their own attorneys.422  
Commentators suggest—since the explanation of a “loser pays” system 
is not possible—there are other bases for low litigation rates in Japan, 
including: few attorneys, high court filing fees, small damage awards, 
slow-paced litigation, high burdens of proof, and prevalence of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution.423  These factors mean that few cases 
 
United States, see infra note 423 and accompanying text. 
421. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, STATISTICAL TABLES 2004–2008, available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/info/statistical_table/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).  
This compares to approximately 271,000 civil cases pending in U.S. Federal District Court in 
2008, with approximately 245,000 filings and approximately 238,000 terminations.  ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, at tbl.C (2008) 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2008 
/tables/C00Mar08.pdf.  This number does not include the case loads of the state courts; for 
those, see R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 1–9 
(2009) (describing civil caseload statistics for 2007 spanning various states and subject 
matters). 
422. Carl F. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure Code: Has It Fostered a Rule of 
Law Dispute Mechanism?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 511, 532 n.87 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman, 
Japan’s New Civil Procedure] (citing TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, at § 2.04(3) (2002)).  See generally Matthew J. Wilson, 
Failed Attempt to Undermine the Third Wave: Attorney Fee Shifting Movement in Japan, 19 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1457 (2005) (evaluating and explaining why attorney fee-shifting 
movement has failed in Japan).  Compare the above sources with the German rules, supra 
note 365 and accompanying text, and those in England, supra note 298 and accompanying 
text. 
423. See generally John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE 
STUD. 359 (1978) (describing that judicial system fees and delays result in low litigation 
prevalence rates); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement 
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989) (finding that low 
litigation prevalence rates are related to encouragement of settlement); Nobutoshi 
Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in Japan: A 
Structural Analysis, 25 INT’L LAW. 443 (1991) (noting low litigation prevalence rates related 
to the structure of Japanese civil system). 
 Regarding the effects of the number of attorneys in Japan, see Edward I. Chen, The 
National Law Examination in Japan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 20–21 (1989); Feldman, supra 
note 414, at 266–67; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 526; Elliott J. 
Hahn, An Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 517, 522–31 
(1983); and Yoichiro Hamabe, Changing Antimonopoly Policy in the Japanese Legal 
System—An International Perspective, 28 INT’L LAW. 903, 904 (1994). 
 Regarding the effect of high court filing fees, see Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. 
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will be filed, and fewer still result in trial. 
In addition to court structures and claim bases, the third necessary 
area to review is the procedural management of torts claims filed in 
Japanese District Courts, from filing to trial.  As with all the legal 
systems discussed, a case begins when the claimant files his or her 
Complaint.424  The Complaint must specify in detail not only the nature 
of the claim, but the facts necessary to support the claims, and must 
include documentary evidence.425  After review to determine whether 
the Complaint states a cognizable claim for relief, the judge will serve 
the Defendant.426  Following the Defendant’s filing of an Answer, the 
court may set hearings to clarify the positions of the parties, or to 
encourage ADR or other compromise.427  After these initial procedures, 
 
Raddock, Japan’s New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, but Access 
to Recovery Is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 669, 711 (1996); 
Feldman, supra note 414, at 264–65 & tbl.2 (containing a table explaining the fee structure in 
detail); Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 526; and Yamanouchi & 
Cohen, supra, at 453. 
 Regarding the effect of low damage awards, see Behrens & Raddock, supra, at 711–17; 
Feldman, supra note 414, at 265–66; and Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 
422, at 526–27 (citing JOSEPH W.S. DAVIS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN 279 (1996)). 
 Regarding the effect of the slow pace of litigation, see Behrens & Raddock, supra, at 
705–06; Feldman, supra note 414, at 268–70 (describing the “languid pace of trials”); 
Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 527; Kojima, supra note 405, at 
689–90; and Ota, supra note 405, at 565. 
 Regarding the effect of the high burden of proof, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 
218, at 324–25; Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States, 37 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 265–66 (2004) (noting that burden of proof remains well above 
preponderance of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt: a “high 
probability”); Feldman, supra note 414, at 263; Kojima, supra note 405, at 708; and Osaka, 
supra note 414, at 394–95. 
 Regarding the prevalence of ADR, see DEAN, supra note 407, at 356–61 (containing a 
detailed review of the role of ADR in Japan and noting that structures of ADR are “long 
established, entrenched and well used within the modern legal system”); Goodman, Japan’s 
New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 527; and Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective 
Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 815 (2003). 
424. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 270; Kojima, supra note 405, at 697. 
425. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 270–71 (citing MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU 
[Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure], art. 53); Kojima, supra note 405, at 697. 
426. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 272–73; Kojima, supra note 405, at 697.  If 
the complaint lacks a basis for relief, the court may reject the initial filing and provide the 
Plaintiff a chance to revise the pleading.  Id.; see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra, at 273 
(citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 137 (Japan)). 
427. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 277; Kojima, supra note 405, at 699–706 
(explaining plenary hearing procedure, preparation, and the authority of court to order 
preparatory hearings prior to the plenary hearings). 
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the court moves the case to the evidence stage. 
As with the German system, in Japan the judge is the primary case 
manager, and there is no clear dividing line between trial and discovery, 
because all hearings are part of the process leading to judgment.428  
Rather, the judge will organize the schedule for the presentation of the 
evidence, indicating in what order issues will be reviewed.429  Hearings 
involve the presentation of documentary evidence,430 witness 
testimony,431 party testimony,432 and expert opinion.433 
Once the court decides that it can decide a claim, the court will issue 
a judgment affirming or rejecting a party’s claim based on the 
evidence.434  Each judgment includes a statement of findings of fact, the 
bases for those conclusions, and the result.435  If some part of the case 
still remains in dispute after the judgment, the case continues in that 
area.436 
Within the constraints of the Japanese legal system, expert witnesses 
operate to assist the court in the determination of the case. 
2. The Role and Function of Experts Within the Japanese Legal 
System 
With a civil code based on the German code, and similar judge-led 
case management, one might be tempted to assume that the role of 
 
428. Kojima, supra note 405, at 689; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 
422, at 536–38.  Regarding the German similarity here, see supra note 373 and accompanying 
text. 
429. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 320–21; see also GOODMAN, THE RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 412, at 347–48 (“This is, after all, an inquisition with the judge in control and 
responsible for clarifying the case; as well as gathering the evidence; as well as making a 
correct determination in the case.”). 
430. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 327–51; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil 
Procedure, supra note 422, at 541–42; Kojima, supra note 405, at 707–08 (describing the 
court’s handling of documentary evidence). 
431. This is if the court decides witnesses are necessary.  GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra 
note 218, at 351–63; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 541–42; 
Kojima, supra note 405, at 706–07. 
432. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 361–63; Kojima, supra note 405, at 707. 
433. Like witnesses, an expert will be called to provide an opinion only if necessary.  
GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364; Kojima, supra note 405, at 707. 
434. Kojima, supra note 405, at 708–10; see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 
417. 
435. Kojima, supra note 405, at 709 (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 
1996, art. 253 (Japan)); see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 418. 
436. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 421. 
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experts in Japan is closely similar to the role in Germany.437  Yet even if 
the expert role is only roughly similar, the justice system has recently 
incorporated changes to the law to improve expert witness procedures.  
With these new procedures, examination of the Japanese system, 
Professor Feldman argues, “ought to be the first step in the much-
needed reform of the U.S. expert witness system.”438 
Experts are called by, and asked to assist, the judge in making his or 
her determinations in the case, when necessary.439  Procedurally, a party 
makes a motion for the court to appoint an expert to help establish a 
fact needed to prove a claim, and the court will decide whether expert 
opinion is required.440  If the court decides an expert is needed, it selects 
the expert441 and provides him or her with the necessary case materials 
to help decide the contested expert issue.442  Once the expert is 
appointed, he or she is required to report his or her opinions to the 
court, usually by a written report but sometimes in oral testimony as 
well.443  As is the case in Germany, the opinions of court-appointed 
experts often hold great influence with the judge.444 
 
437. Regarding expert witnesses in Germany, see supra Part IV.D.2. 
438. Eric A. Feldman, Law Across Borders: What Can the United States Learn from 
Japan?, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 795, 800 (2009). 
439. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 366; TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO 
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 7.06[5][a] (Yasuhei Taniguchi, Pauline C.  
Reich & Hiroto Miyake eds., rev. 2d ed. 2009) (“The role of an expert is to supplement the 
judge’s ability to decide the case by giving an opinion based on his/her special knowledge and 
experience.”); Kojima, supra note 405, at 707; see also Ichiro Otaka, Recent Developments 
Regarding the Intellectual Property High Court of Japan, Address Before the 14th Annual 
Conf. on Int’l Intellectual Prop. Law & Pol’y 5 (2006), available at http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/ 
documents/pdf/thesis/060420_21.pdf (describing the same, regarding expert commissioners). 
440. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364 (citing MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU 
[Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure], art. 129); Feldman, supra note 414, at 270. 
441. HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 439, § 7.06[5][a] (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ 
[MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 213 (Japan)) (noting that the judge selects the expert).  
On the details of expert selection, see infra text accompanying notes 458–473. 
442. Feldman, supra note 414, at 271. 
443. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364; HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 
439, § 7.06[5][b] (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 215(1)); Feldman, 
supra note 414, at 271. 
444. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 296, 364 (“It is likely that the court will rely 
on the neutral expert appointed by the court rather than on a paid expert witness hired by the 
parties.”).  The judicial acceptance of expert opinions at high levels appears to occur in many 
civil law nations.  Regarding the same issue in Germany, see Sendler, supra note 391 (finding 
that experts followed in 95% of cases), and in France, see JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
FRENCH LAW 108 (2d ed. 2008); Robert F. Taylor, A Comparative Study of Expert Testimony 
in France and the United States: Philosophical Underpinnings, History, Practice, and 
Procedure, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 181, 209 (1996) (suggesting that “it is difficult for a judge to 
 
17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:13 PM 
2012] BALANCING LEGAL PROCESS 1397 
A litigant attempting to challenge a report from the court-appointed 
expert may do so in several ways.  Initially, the litigant may contest the 
appointment of the individual chosen as the expert.445  Such challenges 
involve demonstrating to the court that circumstances prevent the 
individual selected from being impartial.446  The challenge may involve 
the expert being unable to “faithfully” give his or her opinion, meaning 
that the expert is biased.447  This is a very high burden to successfully 
challenge an expert.448  Second, a litigant may cast doubt on an expert 
opinion by directly questioning the expert.  For those experts that the 
court calls to testify orally, the litigants may ask questions after the 
court’s questioning.449  Beyond oral examination, litigants may also 
submit written questions to experts, not unlike interrogatories in 
American discovery.450  Finally, beyond initial challenges and 
questioning, a litigant may also retain a party-expert to address the same 
issue.451  While the litigant must make a motion with the court to have 
the party-expert’s opinion heard,452 directly challenging the court’s 
expert with a private expert remains an important method to cast doubt 
on the court’s expert report.453  Even with these methods to challenge 
expert opinion, the single court-appointed expert retains substantial 
influence with the court as its neutral expert technician. 
 
contradict an expert in that expert’s area of expertise, without relying on the opinions of 
other experts”); and William J. Travis, Impartial Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: A French Perspective, 8 INT’L LAW. 492, 520 (1974) (noting that “French courts 
have accorded excessive credibility to the reports of court appointed experts”). 
445. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364; HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 
439, § 7.06[5][a]. 
446. HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 439, § 7.06[5][a] (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ 
[MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 214(1)). 
447. MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 214(1). 
448. Note that, in appointing a particular expert, the judge “has impliedly decided that 
the expert advice sought meets the reliability and professional standards set in Daubert.”  
Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 597 n.332. 
449. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364; Feldman, supra note 414, at 271; see 
also MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 215-2(2). 
450. Feldman, supra note 414, at 271 (“Parties could submit written questions and seek 
clarification of written reports.”). 
451. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 363–64; Feldman, supra note 414, at 270; 
see also HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 439, § 7.06[5][a]. 
452. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 364. 
453. Again, the likelihood of success here appears low: “A judge is unlikely to permit 
such a contradicting witness because to do so would both sanction a challenge to a colleague 
and take additional time in trial.”  Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 
597. 
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As in German civil litigation, the few opportunities to challenge the 
expert after appointment and the high rate of acceptance of opinions454 
result in a critical need for fairness in the expert selection process, to 
preserve legitimacy.455  In Germany, this need for fairness has led to the 
development of professional lists of persons screened to serve as 
experts.456  In Japan, the judiciary has not traditionally created similar 
lists.457  Instead, before recent reforms in 2004, the selection process 
involved several procedures, including asking for assistance from 
professional societies or from university scientists.458  Then the court 
would proceed with party-led expert selection involving multiple 
challenges and reconsideration.459  The traditional expert selection 
method, averaging 133 days for an expert to be recruited by a court, was 
felt to be inefficient.460 
In 2001, out of a growing dissatisfaction with the state of the existing 
selection process,461 the Justice System Reform Council made 
suggestions to supplement existing expert selection methods.462  In 2003, 
the Diet adopted reforms to the expert selection process, effective in 
2004, based on the Reform Council recommendations.463  The reform 
measures adopted an alternative to traditional expert selection, an 
“expert commissioner” system in which experts in technical or scientific 
areas register to serve as experts.464  The purpose of this alternative is to 
 
454. See supra note 444 and accompanying text. 
455. On the issue of expert selection tied to creating “reliable and convincing 
judgments,” see Otaka, supra note 439, at 5.  On the issue of expert commissioner reform, see 
infra text accompanying notes 461–474, as a response to the challenge presented by 
technically complicated cases, see Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 
595.  Regarding the issue of expert selection and legitimacy in the Germany, see supra Part 
IV.D. 
456. See supra text accompanying notes 402–404. 
457. Feldman, supra note 414, at 270 n.41. 
458. Id. at 270–71 (citations omitted). 
459. Id. 
460. Id.; see also GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 365 (“The [Justice System 
Reform] Council was concerned that inability to obtain expert testimony was one of the 
reasons for the long delay in the handling of cases requiring expertise.”). 
461. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 365. 
462. Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council—For a Justice System to 
Support Japan in the 21st Century, 2002 ST. LOUIS–WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119, 139–
41 (2001). 
463. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 365–66; Goodman, Japan’s New Civil 
Procedure, supra note 422, at 598 (describing the July 2003 reform). 
464. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 366. 
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“enhance the quality and accuracy of the trial proceedings.”465 
Under the new system, the Supreme Court selects and maintains a 
registry of expert commissioners willing to serve as experts.466  Currently, 
there are around 180 experts serving as expert commissioners, each 
selected “from among top-level technical experts in various scientific 
fields such as leading scholars, researchers at public research institutes 
or private corporations, patent attorneys and so on.”467  Expert 
commissioners serve part time for two-year appointments.468 
Under this new system, any court needing expert assistance in 
litigation may appoint experts who are listed on the expert 
commissioner registry, as an alternative to traditional procedures.469  The 
appointed expert commissioner then assists the judge on technical 
matters, whether by assessing the evidence,470 or even by active 
participation in the case, questioning witnesses directly.471  Opinions 
from an expert commissioner, like any expert, must be heard by both 
sides of the litigation and cannot be received ex parte.472  Beyond the use 
of the expert commissioner lists by judges, private litigants may also 
retain list experts when seeking a private-party expert.473  The 2003 
expert commissioner system reforms systematically responded to 
problems with the old selection methodology, and have been praised as 
a substantial success.474 
Japanese procedures for expert witnesses have advanced from the 
traditional procedures into a more efficient system.  While the expert 
commissioner system is relatively new, it shows that a large nation can 
attack the shortcomings of its expert system, and in so doing rebalance 
legal process and scientific expertise. 
 
465. Otaka, supra note 439, at 6. 
466. Id. at 5 (citing MINJI SOSHŌHŌ [MINSOHŌ] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 92-2 (Japan)) 
(purpose is to assist the court). 
467. Id. at 6. 
468. Id. 
469. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 366–67; cf. Feldman, supra note 414, at 
270–71 (noting the long delays of Japan’s system, which does not maintain an expert list for 
judges). 
470. Feldman, supra note 414, at 272. 
471. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 365 (citing MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU 
[Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure], art. 133). 
472. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure, supra note 422, at 598. 
473. GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 218, at 366–67. 
474. Otaka, supra note 439, at 6 (finding that the expert commissioner system “has been 
favorably received so far”). 
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V.  ASSESSMENT OF METHODOLOGIES FROM OTHER NATIONS THAT 
MAY BENEFIT EXPERT WITNESS HANDLING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Having reviewed expert methodologies in several nations, one can 
see that balancing technological or scientific expertise and legal process 
can be addressed by a variety of means.  It is precisely this variety of 
approaches that provides a fertile source for law reform efforts, as 
Haack suggested: “Maybe we could learn something from the 
experiences of other countries that are equally technologically 
advanced, but have different regulatory and legal arrangements.”475  
Other commentators agree with her premise.476  The question then 
becomes: what would work here? 
A.  Procedures That Cannot Be Considered for Use in the United States 
Initially, it is important to note that many procedures used in other 
nations cannot be considered for transplantation to the U.S., whether or 
not they would address weaknesses in Daubert.  Examples will help 
demonstrate the point. 
One methodology that cannot be considered in the U.S. system is 
the Canadian practice of extensive judicial comment on the evidence, 
including the expert opinions.477  As allowed by Canadian law, the 
comment on evidence allows judges to state a personal opinion on the 
strength of the evidence, ostensibly to assist the jury.478  While it is 
perhaps helpful to the jury to hear the judge’s viewpoints, judges in the 
United States are specifically prohibited from offering opinions on 
evidence, pursuant to the Judicial Code of Conduct and other ethical 
standards.479 
A second expert witness management device in use elsewhere that is 
inappropriate for reform in the United States is the Japanese practice of 
allowing experts to directly question witnesses.480  In Japan, an 
appointed expert commissioner may assume a role beyond the limits of 
an expert in the United States, so that the expert may be directly 
 
475. Haack, supra note 17, at 23. 
476. See Feldman, supra note 438, at 800; Langbein, The Influence of Comparative 
Procedure, supra note 10, at 552; see also Bryan, supra note 9, at 526–31 (explaining that 
advantages may come from examining foreign law and exploring Langbein’s example of the 
“German Advantage”). 
477. See supra text accompanying notes 281–285. 
478. Vidmar, supra note 247, at 165; see also supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
479. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 3(A)(6) (2009). 
480. See supra note 471 and accompanying text. 
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involved with in-court presentation of evidence including witness 
examination.481  While intended to efficiently facilitate the presentation 
of evidence, this expansive role exceeds the more limited role of experts 
in U.S. litigation.  Experts in the United States are witnesses providing 
evidence, rather than parties directly involved in case management.  In 
addition, the questioning of witnesses is the responsibility of the 
parties—through their attorneys—or in some instances, the court 
itself.482  While witness examination is within the discretion of the trial 
court,483 use of a witness in this way—as an advocate, not as evidence—is 
not a procedure approved within current limits of judicial discretion.484  
Without specific authorization, the use of experts to question witnesses 
would be an abuse of the court’s discretion. 
One final procedure other countries use that could not be directly 
adopted in the United States is the near-universal use of bench trials for 
complex torts.  In every system discussed herein, the court is usually the 
trier of fact for complex claims.485  Even in those systems that permit jury 
trials in civil cases—as Canada and the U.K. do for certain claims—torts 
requiring extensive scientific or technical evidence are removed from 
jury consideration.486  Part of the basis for removal, or assignment to the 
court initially, is confidence in the judge’s ability to handle complex 
cases that may be beyond the jury’s capacity.487  Yet in the United States, 
 
481. Id. 
482. The court may, under the rules of evidence, call or question witnesses.  FED. R. 
EVID. 614.  This power is rarely exercised.  Cheng, supra note 92, at 1304; Alfred Gitelson & 
Bruce L. Gitelson, A Trial Judge’s Credo Must Include His Affirmative Duty to Be an 
Instrumentality of Justice, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 7, 13–14 (1966). 
483. FED. R. EVID. 611(a). 
484. David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1155, 
1178 (1992) (describing the trial court methods to control questioning of witnesses to include 
control of the order of evidence, permitting narrative questioning, recall of witnesses, 
permitting re-direct or re-cross, or taking evidence in installments). 
485. Regarding Canada, see text accompanying notes 247–248.  Regarding the U.K., see 
text accompanying notes 288–293.  Regarding Germany, see text accompanying notes 369–
372.  Regarding Japan, see text accompanying notes 429–436. 
486. Even where a jury is permitted, Canadian rules permit removal of the case from the 
jury due to significant complexity.  See supra text accompanying note 249.  In the U.K., while 
jury trials may exist for certain exceptional tort cases, cases may also be removed from the 
jury due to complexity.  See supra text accompanying note 292. 
487. In the U.K., for example, the court in Ward v. James noted that “in personal injury 
cases trial by jury has given place of late to trial by judge alone, the reason being simply this, 
that in these cases trial by a judge alone is more acceptable to the great majority of people.”  
Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273, 295 (C.A.). 
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the right to a jury trial in Federal court exists as a constitutional right.488  
A mandatory bench trial in complex torts would therefore require 
constitutional amendment overturning this long-standing right, and so 
this method of expert witness management cannot be considered in the 
United States.489 
B.  Methodologies That Should Be Considered for Adoption in the 
United States 
While many methodologies of expert witness management cannot be 
transplanted into the U.S. legal system, there are several that lawmakers 
should consider.  Each procedure discussed represents a specific change 
to the current expert witness balance of legal process and scientific 
expertise, to fix areas of weakness within the Daubert regime.  With 
these options, expert witness reform can develop not from unilateral 
development of the current U.S. system, but through limited 
transplantation of tested procedures already used in other major legal 
systems.  We need not reinvent the wheel. 
1. Canadian Summary of the Evidence, and Additional Disclosures 
The first example of an expert management device from another 
nation that could assist expert management in the United States comes 
from Canada.  In Canada, at the end of a trial, the judge summarizes the 
evidence, objectively stating the evidence and issues in the case for the 
jury.490  In the United States, however, we rely on the advocates to 
 
488. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.   
 
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental 
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh 
Amendment.  A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed 
by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the 
courts. 
Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752–53 (1942).  Empirical research demonstrates 
that, as a percentage of total Federal trials for tort claims, bench trials are less prevalent now 
than in the past.  See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 536 tbl.A-4 
(2004) (finding that bench trials constituted 30% of tort trials in 1962, and 31% in 1972, 
compared to 22% in 2001 and 27% in 2002). 
489. See Jurs, supra note 29, at 34 (“[Congress] lacks the power to strip parties 
contesting matters of private right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury.” (citing 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–52 (1989))). 
490. See supra text accompanying notes 275–280.  Summation is separate from judicial 
comment on the evidence, a broader privilege fundamentally inconsistent with the judicial 
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summarize the evidence at the end of the case for the jury.  Even so, the 
idea of packaging and presenting issues offers a solution to a persistent 
Daubert problem: the management of the challenges to experts at 
“Daubert hearings.”491 
Consistent with the Canadian example then, we should consider 
adopting mandatory summary of expert evidence for the judge to use at 
a Daubert hearing, to assist the judge in deciding what are the 
fundamental issues contested by the parties and the specific details of 
evidence to support each party’s contention.  This Article therefore 
proposes a new requirement for parties to file a joint disclosure in cases 
with contested Daubert issues.492  The disclosure would be completed by 
both parties, not unlike a pretrial order, and must include these 
materials:  
 
• Qualifications and background of each expert involved in the 
issues contested by the motion (whether the contested expert 
or the expert in response); 
• Delineation of the specific areas of testimony that are 
contested as improper under the standard of 
Daubert/Evidence Rule 702; and 
• For each contested issue: 
o Areas of agreement between the experts 
regarding the contested issue; 
o Areas of disagreement and each party’s position 
on those issues; 
o Detailed support for each expert’s opinions on 
the contested issue, including all scientific and 
technical bases for those opinions; and 
o Areas of scientific uncertainty with explanation 
of the basis of the uncertainty and the current 
state of research in the area.493 
 
role in the United States.  See supra text accompanying notes 282–284, 477–479. 
491. Regarding judicial difficulty with complex evidence, see supra Part II.D.  Regarding 
judicial unwillingness to utilize current tools to assist them with Daubert challenges, see supra 
Part II.E. 
492. This can be established by a new federal rule, or the addition of a subsection to 
Federal Rule 702 solely applicable to Daubert challenges to experts. 
493. These suggested disclosures are similar to the proposed changes to Rule 56 
suggested by the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules in May 2008.  STANDING COMM. ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE 27–32 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Reports/CV_Report.pdf.  The committee suggested the change to foster well-ordered 
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Upon filing of the disclosures, the court may schedule a hearing to 
take testimony on the motions, or may decide the issue without further 
evidence from the parties. 
The expert disclosures mandated by this proposal serve several 
purposes.  Benefits of the procedure will be classified by the stage in 
which the proceeding case receives assistance: the Daubert hearing 
itself; independent expert review—if desired by the court—pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 706; jury trial; or similar challenges before 
other courts. 
At the first stage—the Daubert hearing—the court faces several 
obstacles with the potential to affect the court’s reliability determination 
on the expert evidence.  Among these obstacles are the selection bias 
from a litigant’s selection of outlier experts, adversarial bias from the 
rigid framework imposed by cross-examination, and judicial 
inexperience with scientific or statistical issues.494 
More specific disclosures, as outlined above, help address all of these 
shortcomings.  An outlying expert may or may not be identified as such 
by the judge under the current rules, but when forced to explain in detail 
the basis for each contested opinion, it becomes more likely that the 
testimony can be assessed within the context of the entire scientific 
field.495 
The same benefit accrues regarding the adversarial methods of 
cross-examination.  With cross-examination, a party has the ability to 
cast doubt—merited or otherwise—on the expert’s position, while 
empirical evidence demonstrates that experts sometimes respond by 
 
and concise motions in this area.  Id. at 25.  However, after the comment period, the 
Committee decided to shelve the procedure, as not required as a mandatory requirement for 
all cases.  STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE 
CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 7 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Supreme%20Court%202009/Excerpt-CV.pdf.  In the context of 
Daubert and contested expert testimony, the disclosures would serve an appropriate purpose.  
See infra text accompanying notes 495–505. 
494. Regarding selection bias, see supra Part II.B.  Regarding adversarial methods and 
bias, see supra Part II.C.  Regarding judicial difficulty with complex evidence, see supra Part 
II.D. 
495. This is not to say it will necessarily be excluded as unreliable, then, depending on 
the infirmity of the position and whether it can be defended.  As Justice Blackmun stated in 
Daubert, the appropriate response to weak expert evidence is not exclusion, but vigorous 
cross-examination.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (citing 
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 
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expressing their opinions more unconditionally.496  Yet, if the issues are 
clearly delineated by the parties in the new disclosures, the judge should 
be better able to determine which cross-examination questions serve to 
cast genuine doubt upon the merits of the expert opinion, and which do 
not. 
Finally, the disclosures assist in addressing the judiciary’s general 
inexperience with complex science or mathematics.  The judge in a 
Daubert hearing must determine scientific reliability, and that role has 
been described as “daunting” or requiring judges to become “amateur 
scientists.”497  Inexperience with science or statistics compounds the 
problem, as inexperienced judges may not be able to critically assess 
methodological weaknesses within an expert’s argument.498  With 
additional disclosures, the court has a clear record of the disputed issues 
and the basis for each, and it becomes easier for the judge to apply the 
reliability test under Daubert to the evidence in the individual case.499 
Even with disclosures, however, some reliability issues will test the 
skills of even the most scientifically-capable juror.  The disclosures 
suggested here have an additional benefit for these cases; the disclosures 
permit a quicker, more efficient review by an independent expert 
appointed by the court under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.500  While 
judges see independent review as beneficial, many are reluctant to 
appoint a Rule 706 expert.  Two reasons for this reluctance are judicial 
concerns about interfering with adversarial process and potential case 
delay.501  The benefit of additional disclosures eliminates these two 
reasons not to appoint a Rule 706 expert. 
First, while in general adversarial norms are used in the American 
system, in the cases mandating these disclosures, the use of these norms 
can potentially affect validity of outcomes.  The disclosures suggested 
here involve delineation of disagreement, the end game of the partisan 
 
496. See supra text accompanying notes 65–83. 
497. See supra text accompanying notes 21–28. 
498. See supra text accompanying note 114; Robbennolt, supra note 114, at 797. 
499. Note that the judge is seeking to review the methodological soundness, the 
“reliability” of the science, under Daubert, to ensure the expert uses the “same level of 
intellectual rigor” in the courtroom as in the laboratory.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137, 152 (1999).  However the judge makes this decision within the wide range of 
discretion afforded to a trial judge on evidentiary issues.  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136, 143 (1997). 
500. Regarding the power of a court to appoint an independent expert, see supra Part 
II.E.2. 
501. See supra text accompanying notes 173–174. 
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management of the case, and afterward a non-adversarial framework 
may assist to assure reliability reflects scientific theory on the issue.  
Second, disclosures reduce the concern over the delay in appointment of 
an independent expert, as the disclosures highlight the exact issues in 
play, and the basis for each position.  Any independent expert 
appointed by the judge would have a pre-packaged set of contested 
issues to allow for expeditious review.  Disclosures enhance the ability 
of judges to use the independent expert rule in a greater number of 
cases. 
So far, the focus has been on benefits at the Daubert hearing stage or 
for independent expert review, but the disclosures suggested here would 
also assist at the trial stage.  At the Daubert hearing, the court has to 
determine whether the expert opinion is reliable enough for admission 
under Rule 702.  Should the opinion be unreliable, the court precludes 
the expert from testifying.  In many cases, however, the result of the 
hearing will be that the contested expert’s opinion is deemed “reliable 
enough,” and admitted.502  For those cases, then, the contested expert—
and a counterpart from the opposing party or parties—will testify at trial 
for the jury.  Yet, we know jurors may have the same difficulties in 
assessing complex evidence as judges.503  To the extent the reliability 
issue remains an issue at trial, then the disclosures can also assist the 
jury.  Therefore, the disclosures submitted by the parties to the judge for 
the Daubert stage also should be admissible at trial, on motion of the 
parties or the judge sua sponte, when “good cause” has been shown.  
The disclosures will assist the jury to decide the contested expert 
reliability just as the disclosures helped the judge at the earlier stage.504  
Use by the jury, after all, is the original purpose of summary on the 
evidence used in Canada, and in this form offers the same benefit.505 
The disclosures suggested here would have one final systematic 
benefit: they specifically delineate the state of the science on an issue at 
the time of the decision.  Case opinions discussing complex science often 
 
502. Regarding the standard for admission of testimony at a Daubert hearing, see supra 
note 497. 
503. See supra Part II.D.1. 
504. Of course, the judge reviewed the disclosures under a different standard, but there 
is no reason to think the differing burden would affect the validity of the disclosures at this 
stage. 
505. Again, this is to differentiate between the summary of the evidence, see supra notes 
276–280 and accompanying text, and the judicial comment on the evidence, see supra notes 
281–285. 
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serves as persuasive authority for other judges reviewing the same 
issue.506  Of course, scientific knowledge in a given field constantly 
changes.507  To the extent that any other court addresses the same issue, 
and considers the older opinion as precedent, the court will know 
exactly what evidence was presented in the previous case and served as 
a basis for the opinion.  Knowing the evidentiary basis for the prior 
opinion permits the later judge to establish what evidence in his or her 
hearing was not considered before, and merits particular attention in 
that Daubert review.  The litigants also could note the changes in the 
state of scientific knowledge since the prior precedent, arguing for 
differing treatment based on the new science mandates. 
The additional requirement of disclosures at the Daubert stage, 
based on Canadian procedure of judicial summary, rebalances the 
current procedures used on the issue of expert witnesses in Federal 
court.  But because of the significant benefits of the procedure, changing 
those procedures seems well worth it. 
2. Civil Law Expert Selection Methods 
A second example of a procedure based on one used abroad that 
could assist expert management in the United States originates in 
procedures used in Japan and Germany.  In those countries, the judge 
selects an expert to assist the judge to decide contested issues of 
evidence, and sometimes for case management in Japan.508  The 
selection and role of the expert in these civil law systems contrasts 
significantly with the party-led expert practices in the United States.509  
Yet aspects of the civil law expert selection procedures would offer 
benefits to U.S. expert management. 
 
506. Wendy E. Wagner, Ethyl: Bridging the Science–Law Divide, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1291, 
1293 (1996). 
507. Regarding the scientific method in general, and its methodology of analysis and re-
examination of previously held truths, see Haack, supra note 17, at 7–15 (suggesting that 
“scientific inquiry takes the time it takes, and its progress is ragged and unpredictable”; that 
“scientific inquiry is by nature tentative and thoroughly fallibilist”; and that “there is always, 
at least in principle, the possibility of having to go back and start over on what had been 
thought to be settled questions” (emphasis omitted)); and Sanders, Science, Law, and Expert 
Witness, supra note 68, at 70–73 (noting that scientific inquiry lacks a timetable; “the law’s 
need for relatively prompt closure stands in direct conflict with the scientific convention that 
closure should only occur when a consensus forms, however long that might be”). 
508. Regarding expert selection procedures in Germany, see supra Part IV.D.2.  
Regarding expert selection procedures in Japan, see supra text accompanying notes 461–474. 
509. The use of experts in U.S. litigation is discussed supra Part II. 
17 - JURS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:13 PM 
1408 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1329 
Because the expert selected by a judge in Germany or Japan will 
serve as the single neutral expert in the case, those nations place great 
emphasis on the fairness of the expert selection procedures, so that trials 
maintain legitimacy.510  As a result, these civil law systems have 
developed procedures to ensure that the single expert selected is 
suitable to serve by having recognized skills in the scientific field, but 
also by agreeing to neutral and detached assessment of the facts.511  
Japan and Germany ensure experts will be vetted prior to the specific 
litigation in question, so that they may serve when needed by a judge in 
future cases.512  In some instances, the relevant professional society 
selects those members who wish to and who are well-qualified to 
serve.513  By these methodologies, the person will be seen as fair, or at 
least fair enough, to assist the judge. 
Since the U.S. courts lack systematic procedures to identify or vet 
experts prior to specific litigation, almost all expert selection is 
adversarial and inherently subject to selection bias and other ills.514  Very 
few experts can convincingly demonstrate their inherent fairness and 
neutrality to the level that civil law experts can due to their selection 
procedures.  This Article therefore proposes a new system, established 
through the federal judiciary, to identify experts both well-qualified in 
their field and dedicated to the principle of fair assessment of evidence. 
The selection process would be modeled on the systems of both 
Japan and Germany.  As in Germany, for those experts who are licensed 
and regulated by an administrative governing body—doctors, architects, 
lawyers, dentists, etc.—the proposal amounts to allowing that governing 
body to determine appropriate qualifications, and identify those experts 
who meet high standards for skill and ethics.515  All decisions of that self-
governing body would be subject to oversight by the administrative 
body responsible for establishing lists for other expert areas.  For all 
 
510. Regarding the association of expert selection to legitimacy in Germany, see supra 
text accompanying note 400, and in Japan, see supra text accompanying note 455. 
511. Regarding expert selection in Germany, see supra Part IV.D.2.  Regarding expert 
selection in Japan, see supra text accompanying notes 461–474. 
512. With few limits, any expert on the list may be used by the German judge.  See supra 
notes 402–404 and accompanying text.  Japan adopted a similar approach in the 2004 reforms.  
See supra note 467 and accompanying text. 
513. Professional associations have significant involvement in expert selection in 
Germany.  See supra text accompanying note 403. 
514. See supra Part II.B (describing a selection bias); Part II.C (describing an adversarial 
bias). 
515. See supra text accompanying note 402. 
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other experts not self-regulated—epidemiologists, some engineers, 
college professors—the expertise and qualifications of individuals would 
be vetted through a central administrative body maintained within the 
office of the U.S. Courts, governed by regulations adopted to ensure 
selected experts demonstrate both skill in their field and dedication to 
ethical assessment of the evidence in assigned cases.516 
Once selected, the experts from the lists will be available to serve in 
two separate situations.  First, the experts may be called to serve as 
independent experts by judges under Rule of Evidence 706.517  Any 
judge wishing to have expert review of a specific issue of expertise, 
whether for a Daubert hearing or not, would have access to appropriate 
experts pre-screened for quality.518  Independent of the use of experts by 
the judiciary under Rule 706, any listed expert could be retained by a 
litigant as his or her expert in the litigation.519 
The identification of experts through a civil-law screening process 
provides several important benefits, each addressing a current weakness 
in the Daubert management of experts.  First, the identification of 
skilled neutral experts enables judges to quickly find and retain experts 
who can assist them in reviewing contested scientific or technical 
evidence.  Empirical evidence demonstrates judges themselves may lack 
necessary skills to evaluate complex science in the courtroom,520 with the 
potential to effect reliability assessments in cases involving complex 
science.521  The use of independent experts under Rule 706 provides 
judges with a skilled assistant to help the judge in evaluating the 
litigant’s expert in reliability determinations under Daubert.522  It also 
exposes those attacks on litigants’ experts that are pro forma adversarial 
 
516. Regarding the selection of non-professional experts in Germany, see text 
accompanying note 400.  Regarding the selection of expert commissioners in Japan, see text 
accompanying notes 466–469. 
517. Regarding judicial power to appoint independent experts, see supra Part II.E.2. 
518. With the procedures discussed supra Part V.B.1, the issues for review by an 
independent expert are likely to be delineated for quicker, more efficient review. 
519. Regarding experts and party control, see supra text accompanying note 469 
(suggesting that experts on the expert commissioner list may be retained by private litigants); 
see also text accompanying note 394–395 (describing the appointment of second expert in 
German litigation after request of a party). 
520. See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing empirical research on judicial training in science 
and mathematics). 
521. See supra notes 91, 114 and accompanying text. 
522. See supra notes 150–154 and accompanying text.  For an example of a trained 
economist assisting a judge in litigation, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. 
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) (describing a situation where an economist assisted a judge). 
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tactics, and those that actually expose weaknesses in the science 
discussed by the expert.523  Yet the Rule has, since its inception, been 
used sparingly.524 
A list of available and appropriate experts neutralizes two of the 
major reasons why judges do not currently use Rule 706 procedures: 
delay, and inability to identify a qualified expert.525  If an expert could 
easily be called to serve, and that expert has been pre-screened for skills 
and fairness, then the judge need not worry about the unnecessary delay 
of vetting many candidates nor worry about the skills of the expert.  As 
a result, the expert lists proposed here would reinvigorate the Rule 706 
neutral expert review procedure, allowing judges to seek help more 
often in cases involving complex science. 
Independent of the benefit to the judge, expert lists identified 
through a civil-law screening procedure have separate benefits to the 
litigants stemming from the ability to use experts from the list as their 
party-expert in the litigation.526  Since the lists would be available for 
anyone, the experts identified through these procedures would provide 
litigants with a pre-approved list of experts, who a jury would likely 
consider fair.  Any party could decide that the benefit of choosing an 
expert from the list—blunting attacks based on payment of fees or on 
non-neutrality—exceed the benefits of choosing an expert using 
adversarial techniques but who may be subject to those attacks.  Over 
time, experts retained by litigants would have to blunt partisan over-
reaching, because experts who overreach or who are inappropriate 
outliers in the field will be exposed as the non-neutral adversarial 
experts they are.527  In doing so, the focus can again shift from persuasion 
to the scientific merit of the testimony.528 
 
523. Regarding the use of adversarial methods to create doubt about an opposing 
expert, see Part II.C and specifically text accompanying note 155. 
524. See supra text accompanying notes 159–162 (concluding that the Cecil & Willging 
study shows only 20% of federal judges ever appointed a Rule 706 expert); see also supra note 
165–167 and accompanying text (finding that the study results from Krafka were similar). 
525. See supra text accompanying notes 172–174 (explanation of judicial unwillingness to 
appoint independent experts by Cecil & Willging, Cheng, and Robertson). 
526. Regarding the use of experts by litigants in a civil law nation, see supra notes 470, 
516 and accompanying text (discussing private litigants retaining experts using similar 
method). 
527. See supra text accompanying notes 151–156. 
528. Per Justice Breyer, the Daubert system intended to ensure that experts use the 
same intellectual rigor in the courtroom as in the laboratory.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
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Finally, one other benefit of the proposed procedure is the 
maintenance of the general balance of power within our adversarial 
system.  Neutral experts and additional use of the Rule 706 expert 
procedure may assist the judge in the performance of his or her duties, 
and assist in encouraging outcomes that reflect accurate scientific 
methodologies.  The neutral expert procedure so described does not, 
however, take the decisionmaking authority away from those who 
already have that power: the judge and the jury.  Even if a judge chooses 
to retain an independent expert, the parties maintain the right to present 
their evidence as they see fit, subject only to increased scrutiny from one 
who may see the weaknesses in the scientific method used.529  
Furthermore, an independent expert does not remove the final authority 
to decide from the jury.530  Therefore, the balance of legal process and 
scientific expertise is not subject to radical and unsupported shifts 
inconsistent with our nation’s legal norms.531 
Even with these benefits, the proposal likely will face critical 
responses.  Two important counter-arguments will be reviewed here: 
first, judges will remain reluctant to appoint an independent expert even 
with the proposed system, and second, that the proposal may be 
doomed in light of the experiences of the Court Appointed Scientific 
Experts (“CASE”) program of the early 2000’s. 
Some critics may suggest that even if experts have been identified 
through the procedures as proposed, judges still will not appoint experts 
under Rule 706.532  Current research does show that judges are reluctant 
to proceed with independent experts, and that adversarial norms may 
play a part in that reluctance.533  There are two arguments in response. 
First, to the extent that the critics suggest that the structure of the 
 
529. This is in contrast to the methodology in civil law systems where the judge 
maintains a level of control inconsistent with current American judicial procedures.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 369–374 (Germany), 426–431 (Japan). 
530. See supra note 488 and accompanying text. 
531. This is consistent with Robertson’s argument that “[t]o date, the litigation system 
has not yet found a way to provide factfinders with reliable and unbiased expert signals while 
still leaving the development of cases in the hands of self-interested litigants.”  Robertson, 
supra note 39, at 179. 
532. This argument would be based on the studies discussed supra Part II.E.2 
(identifying reasons judges are reluctant to appoint Rule 706 experts). 
533. See supra Part II.E.2, text accompanying notes 160–172; see also Deason, supra note 
36, at 78 & n.82 (noting that the use of court-appointed experts is described as rare, and 
discussing research on the frequency of these appointments). 
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American system is inconsistent with any inquisitorial procedures,534 the 
current proposal suggests reforms that merely remove barriers to use of 
existing procedures, namely Rule 706.  If Rule 706 experts are not 
appointed because of concerns over delay and to the difficulties of 
identifying an expert, as research suggests,535 then overcoming those 
concerns provides incentives to follow existing procedures.  This change 
is not an inquisitorial usurpation of roles as much as a realization that 
current case management tools need to be updated to be effective.  In 
addition, to the extent the issue is based in defense of adversarial norms 
for their own sake, the first point regarding the managerial role of 
judges remains valid.  In addition, Langbein and others see the 
adversarial norms argument as merely rejecting other approaches 
“because we are Americans and they are Germans.”536  If the solution 
solves a problem in the U.S. system, then this argument seems a weak 
counterpoint. 
Second, commentators like Cheng have suggested a broad-based 
change in the willingness of litigants to accept a “managerial judge” role, 
which allows “a greater degree of inquisitorial thinking, opening the 
door to institutions like court-appointed experts and scientific 
tribunals.”537  If that shift is occurring, then the adoption of inquisitorial 
norms may offer hope “to correct the excesses associated with our 
current adversarial framework.”538 
Third, changes in common law procedures have been known to 
occur even in the least restrictive systems.  In England, for example, the 
Civil Procedure Rules explicitly permit the court to mandate the use of a 
single expert in cases.539  While currently used mainly in routine matters, 
the potential exists for nonadversarial procedures even in the most 
complex tort claims under that rule.540  If England has adopted reforms 
that can remove adversarial control of experts, then that the United 
States might consider it as well. 
 
534. Erichson, supra note 380, at 2006–15, 2023–24 (comparing and contrasting the 
inquisitorial method of litigation with the adversarial method; assessing barriers to common 
law adoption of civil law methodologies). 
535. See supra text accompanying notes 170–174 (citing research and commentary by 
Cecil & Willging, Cheng, and Robertson). 
536. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 202, at 45. 
537. Cheng, supra note 8, at 1401–02. 
538. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and 
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1274 (2005). 
539. CIV. PROC. R. 35.7 (Eng.). 
540. See supra text accompanying notes 336–337. 
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Even if one were to reject the adversarial norm argument, an 
additional criticism of the proposal remains and must be addressed: the 
CASE project, and what it suggests about the workability of this 
proposal.  Established in 1998, CASE was an effort by the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to promote the 
use of independent experts, by selecting experts for a judge to use on a 
case-by-case basis.541  Before accepting requests from judges in 2001, the 
CASE program received endorsement by Justice Breyer in Joiner, and 
the House Science Committee.542  Even with these endorsements, the 
results from CASE are mixed.  Individual judges who have used the 
program attest to its helpfulness.543  However, when CASE becomes 
involved in a case, the result is often an end to the litigation by quick 
settlement.544  As a result, the CASE project was, by late 2008, “no 
longer being marketed, ha[d] not received any requests for experts 
recently, and never achieved [a] high level of use.”545  The inability of 
CASE to gain momentum suggests that the current proposal might 
result in similar problems. 
There are several reasons to think that the current proposal based 
on civil law methodologies would gain greater momentum than the 
CASE project.  One major difference between CASE and this proposal 
is who can take advantage of the program.  The CASE program was 
built to assist solely judges requesting experts.546  With this proposal, the 
system allows judges to find a neutral expert, but also provides 
 
541. Court Appointed Scientific Experts, CASE Mainpage, AAAS, http://www.aaas. 
org/spp/case/case.htm (last visited June 6, 2012) [hereinafter CASE Mainpage] (“CASE staff 
selects experts on a case-by-case basis, tailoring the search to the specific request for 
assistance.”); see also Cheng, supra note 8, at 1396, 1400 (noting the CASE program, but 
suggesting it “faces an uphill battle,” considering its opposition); Timmerbeil, supra note 218, 
at 171–72 (noting the CASE process and suggesting the problem remains in the decision to 
appoint any expert and not with selection of the expert).  Experts were selected by a 
Recruitment and Screening Panel with members including scientists, physicians, and 
engineers.  CASE Recruitment and Screening Panel, AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/ 
spp/case/panel.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
542. 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); CASE Mainpage, supra note 
541. 
543. CASE Experience, AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/experience.htm (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
544. Haack, supra note 17, at 21 & n.104 (recounting a personal recollection of Dr. Mark 
Frankel, CASE Director). 
545. Robertson, supra note 39, at 201 n.138 (citing E-mail from Deborah Runkle, CASE 
Project Manager (Dec. 19, 2008)). 
546. See CASE Experience, supra note 543. 
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programmatic assistance to private litigants retaining party experts.547  
As a result, the program has a broader base of support, benefits more 
actors within the legal system, and is likely to be used by litigants at 
stage of a contested Daubert hearing but also earlier in the process.548 
A second difference between proposals is how experts are identified.  
In CASE, the committees would vet experts only after a judge’s request 
for an expert in that field.549  Because of these procedures, CASE did not 
have standing expert pools or handle general inquiries about expert 
assistance.  Under this proposal, however, experts would be screened 
independent of a specific case in controversy, based on pre-determined 
procedures set by federal regulations written to promote quality 
experts.550  Not only does this ensure broad consistency in assessment of 
expert candidates, it also ensures that any judge or litigant can find a 
Rule 706 expert with little delay.  As a result, the program would 
enhance the profile of the independent expert rule, and make it more 
easily used. 
A third difference between CASE and this proposal is institutional 
backing.  The CASE project was developed and supported by the 
AAAS, a private non-profit with approximately 120,000 members.551  
The CASE project largely depended on AAAS members and other 
people committed to the goals of the project and serving on committees.  
In this proposal, however, the expert management system becomes a 
responsibility and duty of the administrative office of the U.S. courts, 
with full support of the federal government.552  The difference in 
institutional backing provides additional funding, a high profile, and 
consistent levels of use over time, responding to the weaknesses of the 
institutionally weaker CASE program. 
Finally, the proposal presented here has one additional benefit: it 
can learn from the CASE project.  The CASE project began accepting 
judicial requests in 2001, and took requests for many years.  During that 
 
547. See supra text accompanying notes 510–512. 
548. This is consistent with Robertson’s argument that any CASE-type program be 
targeted at litigants in addition to judges.  Robertson, supra note 39, at 201 n.138. 
549. See supra text accompanying notes 542, 546; see also Seidemann et al., supra note 
58, at 60–61. 
550. See supra text accompanying notes 515–516. 
551. About AAAS: What Is AAAS?, AAAS, http://www.aaas.org//aboutaaas/organiza 
tion/index.shtml (last visited June 6, 2012). 
552. See supra text accompanying note 516; see also Seidemann et al., supra note 58, at 
69 (suggesting that federal backing is essential to the success of any program like CASE). 
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time, the committees developed guidelines for expert review.  As a 
result, the managers for the new system should actively solicit the 
assistance of experienced CASE committee members to assist in the 
development of the new administrative framework. 
With several significant advantages over the previous CASE 
program, the current proposal benefits from CASE’s prior attempt to 
manage expert witnesses, while incorporating changes to structure that 
suggest this proposal would have greater long-term viability. 
Adoption of a civil-law expert management system modeled on the 
Japanese and German systems would provide benefits in overcoming 
current problems with Daubert-era expert management in the United 
States. The current proposal offers significant advantages over previous 
attempts to manage neutral experts. It also demonstrates that, at least in 
the area of expert witnesses, the U.S. can and should consider 
alternative methodologies developed in other nations, if those 
methodologies are shown to offer advantages over the current system. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Balancing legal due process with technological or scientific expertise 
is a problem that has generated significant controversy and commentary 
within the United States.  A good starting point to address these 
problems is to acknowledge that the concerns with experts occur not 
only within our system but by other nations with a variety of legal 
systems.  In doing so, we recognize that the problems of Daubert are 
difficult, but not insurmountable, so long as we approach them with an 
open mind, an exploring spirit, and desire to improve results.  This kind 
of approach was suggested by Susan Haack in her article Irreconcilable 
Differences?  The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law in 2009,553 and 
has been followed here. 
By reviewing the weaknesses in Daubert assessment of complex 
expert testimony in complex tort cases, how other nations handle similar 
evidence, and how certain discrete areas of foreign law could address 
the weaknesses identified in the U.S. approach, this Article has offered 
reforms to help judges in balancing the need for accuracy and reliability 
of the science presented in court with maintaining our necessary 
traditions of legal process. 
 
 
553. Haack, supra note 17, at 23. 
